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Abstract

This interdisciplinary thesis examines the concept of sexuality through lenses provided
by economic history, anthropology, and queer theory. A close reading reveals historical
parallels from the late 1800s between concepts of a desiring, utility-maximizing
economic subject on the one hand, and a desiring, carnally decisive sexological subject
on the other. Social constructionists have persuasively argued that social and economic
elites deploy the discourse of sexuality as a technique of discipline and social control in
class- and gender-based struggles. Although prior scholarship discusses how
contemporary ideas of sexuality reflect this origin, many anthropologists and queer
theorists continue to use “sexuality” uncritically when crafting local, material accounts of
sex, pleasure, affection, intimacy, and human agency. In this thesis, I show that other
economic, political, and intellectual pathways emerge when sexuality is deliberately disordered. I argued that contemporary research aspires to formulate new ideas about bodies
and pleasures. It fails to do so adequately when relying on sexuality as a master narrative.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Deployments of Sexuality

Introduction
In this late-capitalist and neoliberal time, notions of a discrete sexuality circulate
widely. The concept of sexuality forms a touchstone for sexual rights and narratives of
sexual liberation. Sexuality is understood as the biological foundation for gay, straight,
and other sexual orientations. Sexuality is conceived as a state from which springs sexual
identities and sexual pleasures. Sexuality is assumed to be a naturally occurring
psychological, biological, and entirely “real” human condition. Sexuality is then tapped
to substantiate theories of deviance and morality and to justify therapeutic treatments,
punishments, and separate “but equal” classes in contemporary society. Most sexualized
narrations of contemporary human experience rely on the concept of sexuality and this, in
turn, shapes contentious political issues about sex, affection, intimacy, and citizenship. In
academic discourse, sexuality is used to make sense of diverse sets of cultural and social
phenomena. It is necessary to ask, however, what is sexuality?
In this thesis I will examine how sexuality should not be understood as a bodily
and psychological reality, as it generally is, but should be understood instead as an
economic philosophy about the body. I follow the historical critique of Michel Foucault
(1978) to establish my critical and historical stance on sexuality. In this thesis I aim to
contribute to a critical study of sexuality by more fully elaborating how economic
philosophies parallel sexologists conceptual development of sexuality. In other words, I
understand sexuality as a social system that addresses the body and its pleasures, but in
ways that seek to discipline and order bodies. The concept of sexuality orders and
1

categorizes bodies through a system of self-scrutiny and self-discipline, and always
against an ideal sexuality constructed as gendered and classed.
Some will argue that sexuality was developed to pertain to all bodies, everywhere.
Certainly the aim of sexologists (the so-called practitioners of “sexual science”
developing at the end of 19th century) was to address all bodies. They did so by
constructing sexuality with normative ideals that, I argue, paralleled and supported
economic thinking about bodies, desires, and pleasures. Classical economic philosophers
composed a central character and subject in their work: a noble, rational, gendered male
patriarch. This ideal later merges with neoclassical economic philosophers‟ interest in
thinking about consumption, desire, and individualism. Sexologists construct their model
of sexuality with these normative standards and measures. This is the foundation of
sexuality, and against which all “other” sexualities are then compared as evidence of
deviance and perversion. In this thesis I closely ascertain how sexologists relied on
economic thinking, worked from these economic ideals, and instilled economic
philosophies in their construction of gendered and classed concept of sexuality.
My thesis on sexuality can reveal the implicit economic assumptions we engage,
albeit unwittingly, when we use the concept of sexuality in our time. Namely, sexuality is
a class-based and gendered ideal about the proper uses of the body, and sexuality
addresses the body and pleasure in ways that parallel neoclassical economic ideals of
proper consumption, proper desire, and proper rational individualism. I argue that
employing sexuality as an analytical category severely limits other critical and material
ways to understand bodies, pleasure, affections, and intimacy. Particularly, I will argue
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that employing sexuality in cultural studies limits queer theorizing, other political
economic perspectives, and feminist criticism about the body and its pleasures.
After establishing sexuality as an economic philosophy of the body, I turn to
examine queer theory and cultural anthropologists‟ assessment of sexuality. Queer
theorists, and anthropologists employing queer theory, offer skeptical and critical studies
of sex, gender, and sexuality. In general, they are critical of sex and gender studies that
posit rigid trans-historical and cross-cultural equivalencies to sex, gender, and sexuality.
In other words, queer anthropological theorists claim that sex, gender, and sexuality do
not offer the same meaning in all times and all places. This is also the central stance for
social constructionists: it is a historical fallacy to offer universalized and naturalized
social concepts.
Social categories, social practices, and social understanding do not mean the same
things, in the same ways, to all people throughout time. Social ideas, like sexuality,
should instead be understood as constructed in particular times and places. This
perspective allows me to ask, again: What is sexuality? How has it been fabricated as an
idea and ideal? I hope to contribute a more nuanced assessment of a historically and
socially constructed sexuality as, foremost, an economic philosophy of the body. I
believe this perspective is underdeveloped in social constructionist theories of sex and in
queer anthropology. I find it necessary to fill in this gap, and I hope my effort contributes
to vibrant queer anthropological studies.
I offer both support and criticism of queer anthropological efforts in this thesis. I
support the necessity for these studies, and the valuable contributions queer anthropology
can offer to cultural studies of bodies and pleasures. I note how queer anthropologists are
3

satisfyingly skeptical of universalized notions of sex, gender, and sexual identity. Yet, I
ask why this critical stance does not more thoroughly engage criticism of sexuality as an
ideal analytical category. I criticize these studies for not taking social constructionist
criticism more seriously. I accept Foucault‟s charge as fundamental and urgent: “The
rallying point for the counter-attack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be
sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures” (1978:158).
I extend this “counter-attack” on sexuality by further developing the idea of
sexuality as a regime of class and gender-based control and order, and in doing so I hope
this helps develop new research strategies in queer cultural and anthropological studies. I
am particularly concerned with this because queer theorists and queer anthropologists
contend their research is necessary for a nuanced, political, and material understanding of
bodily pleasures and affections. We should fully interrogate sexuality for embedded
economic assumptions. Through illustrating the roots of sexuality in economic
philosophy, I hope my study contributes to a more critical stance on the use of sexuality
as an analytic category in cultural research.
I rely on the distinction that Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000)
demarcate. They exhort social and cultural scholars to pay close attention to the
distinctions between “categories of practice” and “categories of analysis.” Social actors
and social organizations use categories of practice to make sense of everyday situations
and create cohesive meaning and understanding in social relations. This does not
necessitate use of the same categories for social analysis (2000:5-6). Brubaker and
Cooper demonstrate this point in a critical discussion of “identity,” and use “race” and
“nation” as additional examples of categories used as people‟s daily and lived categories
4

of practice (2000:6-8). This practical use does not necessitate the category always be used
in analysis, however. For example, people will employ the category of the nation in a vast
array of social institutions and social practices. This use does not make the nation more of
a material, analytic reality even when humans rely on it as a fundamental category to
organize and understand meaning. The nation is as much an “imagined community” as it
is a place of borders and internal and external locations (Anderson 2006). I attempt to
offer a similar critique of the category of sexuality.
In the remainder of this introduction I will preview the remaining chapters, then
further detail Michel Foucault‟s definition of sexuality and the concept of “deployment.”
I use Foucault‟s definition to begin and ground my study, but I further elaborate on the
embedded economic philosophies. I believe this is a necessary elaboration on his
criticism, and one that has not been adequately accomplished. I then closely set my
interdisciplinary methods and theories: critical discourse analysis, theories of
subjectivity, and materialist and feminist-based criticism. This is necessary because an
interdisciplinary study, by design, has no proper disciplinary home. Though frustrating at
times, engaging various disciplinary perspectives and methods can be fruitful, and may
lead to new ways of addressing bodies, pleasures, affections, and intimacies.
I will follow these disciplinary notes with a brief reflection on the politics of sex
and sexual justice. In doing so, I respect a tradition of reflective thinking in contemporary
queer anthropology and queer theory. This tradition values the writer‟s reflections on
social position and influences; this allows me to reflect on why I think this study is
necessary and important beyond theoretical and institutional rubrics. This helps me
contemplate what I hope this thesis offers to the reader, political economist, and queer
5

anthropologist. It also allows me to share with my reader reflections on who inspired this
study and reflect further on what this study may offer to those I care for and about.
In Chapter 2, I compare neoclassical economic philosophies to the sexological
development of sexuality. Sexology is sexual science development in late 19th and early
20th century. Sexological theory and practice continues today. I explain how sexuality is
implemented to rationalize pleasures and affections into the prevailing economic order,
and is used to explain and then limit perceived threats to this order. Sexologists
transformed discordant ideas about sex into an emerging theory of sexuality. Neoclassical
economists make economic action and human behavior intelligible in ways that
ultimately benefit the interests and concerns of a ruling class. The neoclassical
conception of human behavior is gendered and classed; upper-class men are the
foundation for neoclassical economic philosophy. Sexologists distill similar perspectives
on bodies, pleasures, and affections; sexuality is imagined to account for all
manifestations of pleasurable and affectionate behavior, no matter where humans reside.
Any deviation from the classed and gendered norm is troubling to sexologists and
they attempted to explain behavior in remarkably similar ways to neoclassical
economists. I emphasize how sexuality developed as an efficient register of social
interpretation, discipline, and control. In other words, sexuality is developed to interpret
behavior of bodies within a particular framework that emphasized the necessity of order
and control of diverse bodily pleasures. Sexuality is normalized with a Western,
capitalistic ideal of a nuclear family, and with normative desire fixed to an imagined
masculine, rational, consumer psyche. This philosophical synergy is especially evident in
sexologists‟ attempts to form an overarching theory for sexual desire and sexual cultural
6

diversity for the entirety of humanity. This discourse also tightly frames sexuality to an
assumed “natural order.” Accounts of human sexual behavior must circulate then, and
now, through this economic philosophy of the body. Earlier in political economic history,
Adam Smith (1909[1776]) famously proposed an invisible hand guiding labor and a
market economy. Sexologists propose a similar apparition guiding bodies, pleasures, and
affections—and they name it sexuality. I argue that this orientation mystifies the
economic epistemology at the core of sexuality. This mystification is very troubling when
sexuality studies are often assumed to shed light on political economic class conditions,
and somehow counterbalance economic misery through the liberation of bodily pleasures.
Throughout the 20th century, sexual progressives and sexual liberationists argue
that sexuality contained the repressed potential to overthrow economic miseries.
Capitalism was imagined to repress sexuality (Marcuse 1966; Reich 1963) instead of
producing it. Justifications for economic inequity often appeal to ideas of an already
classed, immutable order, and sexuality follows with similar assumptions. Although
sexuality is at times contested in 20th and 21st century social and cultural research, core
gendered and classed economic assumptions remain. This continues to benefit a society
and economy beset with unequal class relations and class discriminations—despite the
supposed universal whispers of sexual freedom. Understanding sexuality as an economic
philosophy is crucial for critical re-assessment of queer anthropology and cultural
research.
In Chapter 3, I examine how anthropologists and queer theorists contest sexuality
as a universal frame for understanding pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency. I
emphasize how certain anthropological and queer thinkers navigate the social
7

construction of sexuality while paying attention to the context of lived, material
experiences. In other words, I demonstrate the dilemma of theorizing with social and
cultural constructionist ideas while simultaneously attempting to account for social
agency and social resistance. I assess the difficulty and rewards when applying social
constructionist theories to the practices of everyday life. This approach sustains a creative
tension for thinking about sexuality. I name this tension a “queer dilemma.”
I conclude Chapter 3 by detailing queer anthropological efforts. Despite brilliant
contestations of sexuality in this combined field of knowledge, queer anthropologists
maintain sexuality in problematic ways. This constrains anthropological and queer
holistic visions of sex and affection as materially expressive of social agency and
culturally and locally specific. I advocate for a more thorough deconstruction of
sexuality—a critical analysis that can emphasize the material limits of sexuality as an
analytical category of research. I gauge other concepts that may be more imaginative for
research: theories of carnality, pleasures and affections, queer sensations, and valuing
descriptions of tacit understandings and knowledge. Sexuality, on the other hand, limits
the development and use of imaginative research questions even when we profess
awareness of the historical construction of sexuality.
Queer anthropology needs to do more than gloss the historical and social
construction of sexuality. It is not enough to point to contested definitions of sexuality,
and then proceed as if this realization does not affect the ordering and maintenance of
knowledge about bodies, pleasures, affections, and agency, in the first place (Oleksy
2009; Altman 2001; Binnie 2004; Leap & Lewin 2002) . This is even more confounding
when much of the work I discuss both creatively and lovingly builds alternate theories for
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understanding pleasure and agency in lived ways (Povinelli 2006; Decena 2011;
Valentine 2007). Queer anthropology is capable of addressing these dilemmas with
thorough attention to the use and misuse of sexuality as a category of analysis.

Setting the Terms and Methods
Addressing Foucault: A Definition of Sexuality and Deployment
Michel Foucault (1978) exposes the deployment of sexuality as a modern
technique of social organization. He argues that sexuality was “deployed” to accentuate
how sexuality was not “discovered” in the naturalistic sense, but instead emerges from
the cross-fertilization of overlapping social discourses concerned with bodies and
pleasures. These include discourses of the religious confessional, the ideal of repressed
sexual knowledge (which he refutes), and the establishment of professions and
government practices that made sex their object and subject of scrutiny. Foucault argues
that sexuality was named and deployed to categorize, order, and discipline bodies. His
effort notes that institutions manage and, in effect, dominate bodies. This management
and domination works through material practices, but it also works through a production
of subjectivities derived from categorical inventions. Through this deployment some
sexual acts are named as perversions of natural orders, and social members are tagged
with these sexual notations. He named this process a “perverse implantation” because it
categorized certain sexual acts and behaviors as reflective of person‟s “real” self
(Foucault 1978:36-40). He contends this process initiates our contemporary conception of
sexuality as the psychologically deepest and most truthful part of the individualized self.
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In other words, invoking sexuality encourages the belief that sexuality is a preordained
and indispensable aspect of being human.
Foucault was intensely concerned that an unwavering belief in this naturalness of
sexuality ignores the social and historical processes creating it as a category, in the first
place. It also ignores the constellations of power and knowledge that operate through it.
Foucault encourages his readers to assess sexuality as a social technique of control that
encourages self-discipline and self-scrutiny. This assessment contrasts with
psychological, biological, and other Western, conventional models of human sexuality. It
also contradicts explanations of sexual orientation as physiologically pre-determined. The
human body contains no “natural” sexuality, according to Foucault.
I follow Foucault‟s lead to understand the human body as inscribed with the
discourse of sexuality and fashioned with its particular assumptions: what is erotically
possible, what is supposedly natural, and what is essential to the human understanding of
the self? This estimation of sexuality upends the established psychological tradition that
composes sexuality as an internal, cognitive development built from of the gravels of
sexual repression and following a predetermined and necessary path. It is important to
note that this is not an estimation of sexuality that competes with other accounts of
sexuality—it is the very basis for sexuality in the first instance. For this study then
sexuality is a “name that can be given to a historical construct… a great surface network
in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the incitement to
discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and
resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of
knowledge and power” (Foucault 1978:105-106). In this way, Foucault notes how the
10

deployment of sexuality built over alliances of kinship that governed the cultural
regulation of bodies prior to an invention of sexuality (1978:103-114). But the
deployment of sexuality did not supplant cultural formations of kinship, instead it
mapped over structures of kinship with a new ideal of “sex” as a category and in service
of sexuality (1978:107). According to Foucault, sexuality is thus deployed along four
major “privileged objects of knowledge” (1978:104-106). In other words, four social
anxieties roused the establishment of sexuality: the “hysterical woman,” the selfpleasuring child, the fertile couple, and the perverse adult (1978:105).
Foucault was aware, as am I, that many will question why it is necessary to
separate off sexuality from sex (1978:150-153). In other words, can sexuality be cleanly
understood as an analytic category that simply organizes our appraisals of sex? Why all
the fuss? Foucault emphatically dismisses this idea. He notes that sex should not be
simply understood as some prior and universal human register of bodily experience. Sex
is made socially intelligible, named, and ordered through the deployment of sexuality
(1978:150-157). Sexuality is not a simple commentary on the capacity of human bodies
to experience sex, and thus sex is not an inherent natural component of sexuality. Both
concepts are historically and socially invented to interpret, manage, order, and discipline
human bodies in particular ways. Surely, the body is biologically capable of pleasure,
reproduction, affection, and emotional intimacy, but these are not dependent on sex and
sexuality. The concepts of sex and sexuality are the tools of a regime of
power/knowledge that made these notions intelligible in our time, and for specific
purposes that I argue are worthy of more critical interrogation. The paradigm of sexuality
needs further interrogation because of the limits it places on our ability to understand
11

pleasure, affection, and intimacy, not because it will forever help us further refine
sexuality as a category of analysis.
I hope my criticism of sexuality foregrounds how it is constructed to catalogue
and stigmatize human bodies and pleasures, but I also hope it demonstrates how the
invention of sexuality channeled concerns about changing social relations, and thus
reflected anxieties about rapidly transforming material conditions. In this sense,
knowledge of sex and bodies “was not discovered so much as deployed, made to sustain
new relations of power (between men and women, physicians and patients, parents and
children), which in turn enhanced the credibility of the knowledge” (Allen 1999:71). I am
trying to show that theories of social construction clearly violate paradigmatic thought on
the naturalness and essentialness of sexuality. This violation demands a reversal of
thinking: “For all of us, essentialism was our first way of thinking about sexuality and
still remains the hegemonic one” (Vance 1989:160). Despite the challenge of this reversal
and given the intellectual influence of Foucault‟s ideas, I still remain surprised how
positivist and empirical attempts to establish sexuality (or one should say homosexuality
and “other” sexualities) demand attention and allegiance.
Foucault‟s monumental History of Sexuality, Volume 1 (1978) is valorized and
consistently cited throughout the academic disciplines. But, it seems that his most crucial
point is too comfortably forgotten: sexuality should be understood as a particular
historical schema that organizes an understanding of pleasure and affection through the
management and control of material bodies and affective alliances. I will add to this
conception by focusing on the classed and gendered way this disciplining and ordering
works. Feminist critics argue that Foucault often missed this vital dimension in his study
12

(Sawicki 1991; Hennessy 1993). I assess economic and sexological literature by focusing
on class conflicts and class tensions within the development of this deeply gendered and
economical sexuality. I hope to make this connection clear and show how sexuality was
invented and refined as a commentary on the bodies of laboring classes, migrants,
women, and non-normative affections and pleasures. Much good work addresses the way
sexuality was invented to fit all bodies, and multiple thinkers assess the way sexuality
was fabricated to address the pleasures and perils of bourgeois bodies. But I will
emphasize the differential equation of class and gender in the invention and ordering of
sexuality, and why this presents a profound dilemma for contemporary queer cultural
research.
Even in the intellectual aftermath of Foucault‟s insights, the analytical ideal of
sexuality remains unfortunately and firmly rooted in cultural research. Even when social
and cultural research addresses Foucault‟s pointed criticism, sexuality still remains the
intellectual container for making pleasure and affection recognizable, meaningful, and
ahistorical. In this way, I fear that sexuality still serves to justify social and political
hostility to migrants and laborers, sexual “deviants,” gendered bodies not marked as
masculine, and bodies that refuse to follow normative social rules. These valuable bodies
are snared in class disputes that result in vigilante surveillance and piece-meal
punishments. For example, perhaps this critical and interdisciplinary study of sexuality
can help illuminate why some bodies are allowed to cross national and international
borders for love, marriage rites, and affection, and others are not. It may clarify why
contemporary age-of-consent laws punish people for affection that does not adhere to
political standards of sexual maturity and proper citizenship. It may help provide further
13

insight into why HIV/AIDS prevention organizations were compelled to adopt categories
like MSM (men-who-have-sex-with-men) in practice, and mostly abandon categories of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual. I hope to critique why, despite the elaborate human
complexity of pleasures, affections, and accounts of human agency, sexuality remains the
primary backdrop in social and cultural research for negotiating the intricacies of bodily
meaning. It is not enough to gloss over a “constructed sexuality” and then ignore what
insights this realizes. I ask: what other intellectual pathways may emerge when sexuality
is dis-ordered in this critical and necessary way?

Critical Discourse Analysis and Sexuality
I aim to critique the economic deployment of sexuality through a lens of critical
discourse theory. Sara Mills (1997) discusses discourse in the following way:
Influenced largely by Foucault‟s work, within cultural theory as a whole,
discourse is often used in an amalgam of the meanings derived from the term‟s
Latin and French and influences (a speech/conversation) and a more specific
theoretical meaning which sees discourse as the general domain of the production
and circulation of rule-governed statements. A distinction may be usefully made
between this general, abstract theoretical concern with discourse and the analysis
of individual discourses, or groups of statements produced within power relations.
[Mills 1997:9]

These power relations are understood as situated in the institutions that govern discourse
and the relations of governance (Macdonnell 1986:3). As noted, questions and criticisms
inspired by Foucault‟s work are common in contemporary intellectual thought. The
critical methods he developed continue to warrant use here for several reasons. First,
14

critical discourse theory recognizes that discourse changes over time but maintains
genealogical relations to the past. Second, new perspectives on present conditions compel
re-examination of past meanings and help one ask whether current social orders and
material distributions adequately address current material realities. Third, critical
discourse theory aids in imagining new ways to live, form politics, and demand change in
the present.
Importantly, the status quo in politics, in economic models, and in cross-cultural
research agendas can be confronted with critical discourse analysis. This method focuses
concern on the way political power relations maintain existing social relations. Using this
lens, I am able to assess how notions of sexuality govern what can be said, how it can be
said, and what is rendered as the possibility of truth within those structures (Mills
1997:48-51). Michel Foucault makes clear that a dominant discourse does not totalize all
possibilities of discourse, and a dominant discourse does not propose that a hunt for some
absolute, powerful cause of terminology is useful:
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it,
any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument of and an effect of
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting
point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it
reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it
possible to thwart it. [Foucault 1978:100-101]

Demarcating sexuality as complex and saturated with obedience and resistance
adequately meets Foucault‟s challenge to avoid assuming ideas have obvious, direct,
material causes alone (McNay 1994:108).
15

This approach also helps me explain how “the discursive and the material are
linked together in the symbiotic relationship of the power-knowledge complex” (McNay
1994:108). Foucault traces formations of power and knowledge and their intrinsic
linkages and mutual dependence: “It is to give oneself as the object of analysis power
relations and not power itself” (Foucault 1994:339). So my use of discourse theory must
account for power/knowledge as a productive force. All discourse is always interwoven
with resistance. Productive power meets resistance and saturates the entire discursive
structure, and all those subjects defined by their relation to it (Rabinow 1994: xiv-xvii).
Foucault designates bio-power as the set of power relations expressed in the technologies
of managing populations under the auspice of social interest (Foucault 1978:137-144).
Bodies are then regulated, controlled, and dominated through ideals of public health,
conceptions of public safety, and notions of social risk. Sexuality is exemplary of the idea
of bio-power.
I propose that discourse analysis can turn our attention away from an ideal that we
can and will “get to the bottom of sexuality,” and instead offers new ways to think of
human bodies in resistance to the coordinated deployments of sexuality. People rely on
the stipulations of sexuality as a category of practice, but we can be more critical of
sexuality as a necessary and always applicable category of analysis. I will demonstrate a
critical discourse analysis on the economic pedigree of sexuality offers new ways of
thinking and may prompt new questions about bodies, pleasure, and social agency.
Through discourse analysis we can continue to “replace an Idealist philosophy of final
emancipation with a nominalist philosophy of endless revolt” (Rajchman 1985:93).
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Sexuality is just one of many social regulatory regimes interested in bodily acts, but it
remains a massively influential one worthy of a revolt against its analytical standards.
I hope this confrontational stance offered by critical discourse analysis endures
herein. Contemporary regimes continually establish an opposite supposition that sexuality
is an inherent and essential condition for pleasure and affection, and it also proposes
sexuality as irrefutable material for a final emancipation from social, sexual control. I
resist this interpretation and believe my work will help others resist this interpretation.

Theories of Subjectivity and Materialist Feminism
A theory of subjectivity in its most compact form asks, “What is the self?”
Answering this question is complicated after postmodern and post-structural
pronouncements of a “death of the subject” (Mansfield 2000:v). Human subjectivity also
represents discursive constructions—humans are always in the making of themselves. In
other words, humans are always in the process of becoming. Critical discourse analysis
provides a method to theorize subjectivity, and it remains a necessary anthropological
analytical tool “where an idea of the cultural remains of value for a mediating
experience” (Mansfield 2000:vi). In this thesis I work from a theoretical conception of
subjectivity to provide “the inclusion of an important dimension of the social into the
analysis” (Wuthnow et al 1984:242). Subjectivity is an expedient way to discuss the
interlacing of power and knowledge and to assess the place of the human sexual subject
in any regime. This cultural reality “is necessarily rooted at some level in human
subjectivity” (Wuthnow et al 1984:242). This provides me with a tool to ask what
“human” is theorized by discourses concerned with bodies, pleasures, and affection.
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This tool also allows me to comment on the “dynamic and unsolved tension
between the bodily, self, and social/political processes that, we hold, is the core of
subjectivity” (Biehl et al 2007:15). I connect a theory of sexual subjectivity to the critical
stance of materialist feminism. Theorizing discourse and subjectivity allows me to further
assess the complications of lived, material realities. I then can rely on the materialist
feminist criticism that these lived realities are inherently gendered and class-based. I find
this contestation necessary to resist the regime of sexuality across disciplinary studies. In
doing so I can ask, “What is the gendered and classed human sexual subjectivity—named
sexuality?” Materialist feminist criticisms can conflict with theories of discourse and
subjectivity, but at least materialist theories foreground lived realities of empirical human
practice, labor, and life.
This interdisciplinary effort seems to demand a new language entirely. But a new
language is, at times, all that will suffice. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981) offers a similar
invocation of language. He argues that language can control the consciousness and thus
imagined social possibilities. Language, for Bakhtin, is an idiolect of class and social
stratification. The term “idiolect” describes how language functions as a class-based
prison for the imagination, restricting options in social thought and intentionally
narrowing all thought into a monoglossia (one form, one thought, and one language).
Though societies are by default heteroglot (multiple varieties of language) the effort to
hem this heterogeneity in is ongoing. Only contestations of language will free one‟s
thinking and open the mind to new knowledge which “frees consciousness from the
tyranny of language, and its own myth of language” (Bakhtin 1981:61). This profound
assertion about language, discourse, and social possibility is also illuminated by the
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materialist feminist considerations of class and gender. Class constructs the idiolect and
works to reduce social possibility and, literally, new thoughts.
I employ the concept of materialism from Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean in
Materialist Feminisms (1993). A materialist analysis of culture is “informed by and
responsive to the concerns of women, as well as people of color and other marginalized
groups" (Landry and MacLean 1993:x). This standpoint and method offers a “critical
investigation, or reading in the strong sense, of the artifacts of culture and social history,
including literary and artistic texts, archival documents, and works of theory.” In
addition, I find materialist analysis can fit with discursive analysis and provide a similar
“potential site of political contestation through critique, not through the constant
reiteration of home-truths" (1993:xi). My use of class and class terminology like worker,
laborer, and bourgeois I take from Marxist analysis. In addition “Marxist feminism holds
class contradictions and class analysis to be central, and has tried various ways of
working an analysis of gender oppression around this central contradiction…materialist
feminism should recognize as material other contradictions as well… ideologies of race,
sexuality, imperialism and colonialism and anthropocentrism, with their accompanying
radical critiques" (Landry and MacLean 1993: 229). I engage my critical discourse
analysis with this gendered and class critique.
I purposefully use the terms pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency to
limit the use of desire, sex and sexuality, and choice. I find these latter terms weighed
down with contradictory and damaging meanings and histories. Specifically, the term
“desire” summons much of the economic and psychological discourse that I criticize in
Chapter 2. Equally, I avoid the notion of “love” because it presents such an expansive
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opening of possible meaning. I leave it out entirely in favor of the terms affection,
affective alliances, and intimacies. I take a cue from Charles Lindholm who argues
against romantic love being a human universal (1998:243-263). The concept of choice, as
well, parallels the ideals of economic consumption too closely to be useful for my
argument. I employ “queer” throughout this thesis. I do not employ this term as a
category of specified sexual identities, but as a critical stance that works to destabilize the
possibility and necessity for stable “sexual” identities.

Why an Interdisciplinary Study of Sexuality and Social Construction?
A project on “sexuality” engages seemingly endless crossroads of meaning,
application, and consequence. Primarily, sexuality in most academic disciplines is
assumed to be universally, socially, culturally, physically already “there”—a ground on
which to build knowledge, contest derivative meanings, and perhaps argue for alternative
ways of being. In other words, making an inquiry into the social construction of sexuality
is not an original question or criticism in social and cultural research. The reverberations
from this knowledge and “what to do with it,” though, remain contested in academic
disciplines, research projects, and economic development projects.
I ask why the deep and rich contribution of social constructionist thinking on
sexuality has not sufficiently destabilized the concept in social and cultural research. I
certainly imagined it would when I “discovered” it as a student. Why, despite the
tremendous influence of social constructionist theories, does sexuality remain the de facto
interpretation of the body and its pleasures? Why do cultural and social theorists continue
to deploy the category of sexuality while invoking social construction theory as a frame
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for research? It is far more comprehensible when the discourses of psychology, medicine,
biology, sexology, and sociology invoke sexuality, since a supposedly natural sexuality is
historically invented and cemented within these disciplines. But within other critical
studies, why do thinkers simultaneously position research as social constructionist, yet
ignore the blunt and limiting scope of sexuality as an explanatory structure? Even more
confounding, why would some queer cultural research take a strident stand for social
constructionist elucidation, but simultaneously offer sexuality as a meaningful heuristic
and philosophy of the body? It is as if a scholar devoted to critical race studies decided
that race was a biological reality, after all. Clearly, there is more intellectual work to be
done and these concerns inspire this thesis.
As a student, I traversed the de-territorialization and dis-orientation of a bodily
sexuality across academic disciplines. At first, I naively imagined a different world
emerging from the heap of ashy essences that social construction blithely burned through.
I now must account for the limits of this type of critical engagement, as well as what
further engagement may still promise. Even in the most critical studies of sexuality, the
ideal that sexuality offers a necessary summary of pleasure, affection, agency, and
material life remains. This realization is a particularly disturbing problem among research
aiming to counter hegemonic social forces and debasing economic and political
conditions. Contemporary sexual research may aspire to formulate other ideas about sex,
pleasure, materiality, and human agency, but often fails to do so. I offer a criticism of
intellectual practices that deconstruct sexuality only to counterintuitively deploy it, yet
again, as a human universal measure. I hope to demonstrate that other ways of thinking
about pleasure, materiality, and human agency are intellectually possible when the blunt
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force of sexuality (and its limited capitalistic vision of bodies and pleasure) is eschewed.
In other words, I want to argue that sexuality is a capitalist axis for normative ideals of
gendered and class-based pleasure and embodiment.
I select economic history, cultural anthropology, and queer theory for this thesis
study. I do so because of the following considerations. First, I examine sexuality in
relation to economic philosophy because of my concern with material inequalities in
society. Second, I selected cultural anthropology for closer study because it generally
attempts a holistic study of material conditions and human subjectivity (Roseberry 2002;
Patterson 2001:103-164; Kurtz 2001:14-15; Wolf 1982). Both economic philosophy and
cultural anthropology have been criticized for avoiding the topic of “sex” in research
(Weston 1993, 1998; Lyons & Lyons 2004; Markowitz & Ashkenazi 1999; Kulick &
Willson 1995). I note, instead, that close reading of economic and anthropological
literature demonstrates a depth of theorizing concerned with sexed and gendered bodies.
Economists and anthropologists do not necessarily avoid “sex,” but too often assume its
coherent presence as “sexuality.” Finally, queer theorists explicitly devote their research
to social constructionist theories of pleasure, affection, and social resistance, but queer
theories are routinely criticized for evading materialist and economic reckoning
(Hennessy 2000; Wolf 2009). Nevertheless, queer theories form a gratifyingly skeptical
study of normative beliefs.
In each of these disciplines, contentious debates about materialism, social agency,
and bodies and pleasures remain ongoing. I find these intersections rewarding and
productive ground for my thesis. My attempt to materialize pleasure and social agency
and destabilize the category of sexuality in queer anthropological work is complicated. It
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requires this holistic, interdisciplinary study. Although I explicitly acknowledge this
interdisciplinary focus, I do perceive my study following an anthropological tradition,
and I attempt to maintain an anthropological perspective throughout.
The anthropological perspective prompts me to remember people are flesh and
blood, cultural animals governed by forces often outside our planning and control. This
prepares me to pay close attention to the material realities that govern human life. John
Gray asserts in Straw Dogs: Notes on Humans and Other Animals:
Today, for the mass of humanity, science and technology embody 'miracle,
mystery, and authority'. Science promises that the most ancient human fantasies
will at last be realized. Sickness and aging will be abolished; scarcity and poverty
will be no more; the species will become immortal. Like Christianity in the past,
the modern cult of science lives on the hope of miracles. But to think that science
can transform the human lot is to believe in magic. [2007:120]

I find this quote especially helpful for guiding my critique of sexuality. Sexuality is
imagined to be an essential understanding of all human life and bodies. John Gray‟s
assertion helps me realize that human bodies and pleasures will always remain too
dynamic for any totalizing explanation. I also think this insight is pivotal for maintaining
an active anthropological imagination and an idea of holism within cultural study.
In undertaking this project, I endeavor to piece together the puzzle that persisted
throughout my interdisciplinary studies. Again, why does sexuality endure despite the
deep and profound criticisms launched at it? Can my criticism herein prompt some
change in queer anthropologists‟ theories and criticism? How can we ask new questions
about pleasure and affection that prompt changes in ways we might imagine political
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agency and social solidarity? Is it possible to re-cast sexual orientations and gender
expressions as evidence of resistance to debasing modes of life in late-capitalist,
neoliberal economies?
Lately, I am afraid that sexual and political theorists have been lulled into
addressing diverse human affections and pleasures as simple distillations of capitalistic
development and progress. Importantly, if sexuality is used as a category to orient sex,
pleasure, affection and social practices, then what other possible interpretations are lost?
Contemporary Western sociality demands allegiance to a tangible sexuality in identity
politics, liberal philosophy, economic alliances, and registers of intimacy and citizenship.
A study of political economy and sexual subjectivity in queer anthropological research
can, and must, proceed without sexuality as the primal explanation for bodies, pleasures,
and affections. I cull examples from my local community to demonstrate a queer
anthropological perspective. I hope to appeal to the local reader, too, but I aim to
demonstrate the need for critical attention to political economic and queer anthropology
at home, as well as in other locations.
In metropolitan Portland, Oregon homeless shelters were increasingly full after
the last economic recession. Gender segregated dormitories were the prevalent
organizational structure among the majority of shelters. Couples, whether in new
relations, married, or otherwise companioned, were disallowed from sleeping together, or
even in proximity to each other (Saker 2009). The necessity for safety in dormitory
settings was made clear, but the assumption remained that a need for shelter trumps (and
supposedly should trump) any affectionate alliances among those who needed shelter.
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The dignity of affectionate relations was apparently dependent on the possession of
property.
Next, the Mayor of Portland, Oregon, Sam Adams was implicated in a 2008 “sex
scandal” where he was accused of an affectionate and sexual relation with a 17 year-old
male. Local newspaper Just Out refused to support the Mayor, although previously
playing a large role in organizing electoral support. Local media coverage of the ensuing
scandal honed in one theme: how “hurtful” Adam‟s act was for the local, “gay”
community (Lang 2009). No local media (“gay” included) considered that a sexual and
affective culture with affiliations of older men of middle-class standing, and younger,
working-class men migrating to the city is an important, long-recognized, and even
celebrated part of the so-called sexual minority community (Boag 2003). In any case, a
17 year and 11-month old male high school graduate is not a world apart from an 18
year-old male high school graduate. No one would speak to this in the local media. Even
putting aside the historical amnesia that girds this “sex scandal,” the Mayor offered a
typical US political apologia for a lapse in moral judgment that this altogether common,
affectionate companionship supposedly revealed. Political fortitude, in this case, was
determined by the demand for sexual piety among the heteronormative political class in
this sexually “progressive” city.
Another example: US West coast institutions of elementary education reveal a
certain sexual piety. Debates about curriculum and textbooks and the necessity, or not, of
including gay and lesbian historical contributions remains a controversial and divisive
topic (Christie 2006). Both sides take aim at an unnervingly similar goal: to fix the
identities of citizens into the regimented framework of contemporary sexuality. Whether
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self-identifications and self-conceptions might offer a more valuable historical rubric of
sex and social agency is lost in the drumbeat of contemporary politics; both sides demand
retroactive historical readings for political gain in the present.
Finally, I would like to note a personal example: across the years of my own
collegiate study I received student health insurance. Meanwhile, dear friends of mine
suffered from ailments from the common (broken bones) to the catastrophic (life
threatening auto-immune disease). In either case, adequately caring for my own affective
kin was made impossible by the stringent guideline that families are made through blood
kinship, marriage, and domestic partnership alone. The chance to form a “family” outside
of the structures of marriage and dependency is severely limited or non-existent. In my
case it would require marrying or partnering with more than one person (clearly illegal),
or claiming my affective kin as economic dependents (more legal, but a bureaucratic
minefield). As my close friend noted with humor, “Maybe you could adopt me?” The
rules of kinship reduced access to material benefits of health care.
The shadow of sexuality looms in each of these examples. All are justified with
particular economic, juridical, or social principles rooted in the supposed primacy of a
presumably transparent and obvious rationale. They each depend, though, also on what
Monique Wittig (1978) argued is the “straight mind.” These examples expose an
obliviousness and reductionism about pleasure, intimacy, and affection that Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick criticizes in the Epistemology of the Closet (1990). I hope these local
“queer dilemmas” illuminate for the reader the contemporary practices that utilize
allegiance to sexuality, and in doing so, limit other values, meanings, and possibilities for
resistance. In other words, it is not only what “happens,” but what is allowable to note,
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what is allowable to ask for, and what is considered politically meaningful and expedient
in contemporary debates about sexuality. Sexuality operates like a looking glass that
distorts complex, affectionate, and material life-ways into seemingly coherent, ahistorical
registers of human subjectivity and morality.
I hope to expose that in the looking glass of sexuality we are all “other.” In other
words, sexuality never captures the ways humans actually live; sexuality creates a portrait
of classed and gendered normalcy that no one is able to summon, no matter how great
their investment in its conventions. Certainly sexuality discourse is globalized (Binnie
2004), but bodies, pleasures, and affection is always simultaneously localized.

A Note on the Politics of Sexuality and Reflexivity
This is a political project; discussing sexual politics means confronting material
debasement and exploitation (capitalist, or otherwise). Assessing limitations to the range
and capacity of erotic subjectivity furthers this aim. The question is no less pertinent
today than in 1984 when Gayle Rubin proposed in Thinking Sex: Notes for A Radical
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality:
A radical theory of sex must identify, describe, explain, and denounce erotic
injustice and sexual oppression. Such a theory needs refined conceptual tools
which can grasp the subject and hold it in view. It must build rich descriptions of
sexuality as it exists in society and history. It requires a convincing critical
language that can convey the barbarity of sexual persecution. [1984:267-268]

I offer a critical language here with eagerness, but no small amount of trepidation. Even
in this necessary call, Rubin relies on (and obviously deeply influences) a deployment of
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“sexuality” to make coherent what I hope to describe—then disrupt. I argue that another
place to begin this denouncement is to further the interrogation of the political economic
and historical construction of sexuality, and then use this position to examine
contemporary queer anthropology. I make this attempt so that I, too, may more
adequately convey and denounce the barbarity of the many forms of persecution and
injustice.
Critical inquiries, too, involve questioning closely held beliefs and customs. Even
as I introduce the outline of my criticism here, I reflect on the political and material
ramifications of relying on sexuality and gender differences as categories of practice to
carve more equitable modes of life and gather material support for my communities. An
inspection of the practices where I also shape my relations, pursue passions, and join
politicized communities is difficult and demanding. So why do it? I defer to Lynn Huffer
on this point:
The story of queerness—as a story about madness—begins with the story of a
split: a great division between reason and unreason. That split organizes
Foucault‟s histoire—his history and his story—about forms of subjectivity tossed
into a dustbin called madness. Queerness is a name we have given to one of those
forms. Since the early 1990‟s, we—queer theorists and loving perverts—have
tried to rescue the queer from the dustbin of madness and make her our own.
Theory calls this gesture resignification: we have dusted her off, turned her
around, and made her into something beautiful.
But, somehow, over the years, the queer has become a figure who has lost
her generative promise. She turned in on herself and became frozen into a new,
very American identity. And if the transformation itself is to be celebrated, the
final freezing is not. Getting stuck in identities that are often politically or
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medically engineered, the queer is drained of her transformative, contestatory
power. [2010:1]

Pragmatic encounters with identity and injustice are central to sexuality research and
pedagogy in contemporary, liberal education. Students and teachers continually address
accounts of injustice and must respond to stupefying horrors enacted under the banner of
sexuality. Students are then asked to assist in imagining a world where utopic visions
should be suspect, but fervent praxis in aid of human rights, multiculturalism, and for
liberal tolerance is ostensibly self-evident and sound philosophy.
Friends, lovers, and citizens are tagged with sexualized and gendered identities.
They are then expected to speak with a singular voice. Diverse knowledge and experience
is condensed through the prism of social difference, and sexuality is assumed to be the
closest position to a more noble truth. Accepting a normative sexuality is supposed to be
the best path to social acceptance and social equity. This is a limited vocabulary of socalled “freedom.” As Lisa Duggan reminds political activists in her critique of the gay
marriage movement:
As the army of lovers and ex-lovers we often imagine ourselves to be, queer
people, perhaps more than others, might be expected to see marriage as a much
too narrow and confining status to accommodate our elaborate, innovative forms
of intimacy, interconnection and dependency. But rather than continue to expand
the forms of partnership and household recognition begun by the LGBT
movement in the 1970s, the marriage equality campaign has resulted in a
contraction of options. [Duggan 2011]
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Engaging a critical study of sexuality may offer ways to remove oneself from these
idiosyncratic but terrifyingly reductive margins. Most often, one is obliged to remain in
these margins in the name of social stability and in support of a naturalized system of
sexual identity. Remaining, frozen there, is not acceptable to me, and thankfully not
acceptable to many scholars and writers I reference in this thesis (admittedly, even those I
critique for not doing more). John Gray measures our liberal dilemma:
The task of political philosophy is not to give practice a foundation. It has never
had one in the past, yet somehow the human species has tumbled on. The aim of
political philosophy is to return to practice with fewer illusions. For us, this means
shedding the illusion that theories of justice and rights can deliver us from the
ironies and tragedies of politics. [Gray 2000:139]

Sexuality is too often invoked as solid ground for social organization and social identity,
promising a more truthful understanding of the self and providing pathways to more
ethical and just societies, delivering us from “the tragedies of politics.”
At the very least, the explanatory power of sexuality assumes a natural
assemblage of pleasure and affection and demarcates boundaries for meaningful, moral
engagement with others. I now find this assumption deeply troubling. I engage in this
thesis study to find other pathways around these constraints for an “army of lovers and
ex-lovers.” I strive to imagine other possibilities for thinking about political economic
materiality of pleasure and affection, and return to practice with fewer illusions. This is
challenging. I am reminded of Pierre Bourdieu‟s concept of doxa in an Outline of a
Theory of Practice (1977). Bourdieu summarizes doxa as the status of social knowledge
that appears as self-evident, obvious—as knowledge that “goes without saying” within a
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society. It is certainly impossible to address every resulting social difficulty through the
practice of critical analysis (shared meaning, it is useful to remember, is how sociality is
built). Nevertheless, what I hope to address is why criticisms that already shattered the
chimeras of sexuality do not rid us of its doxic charms. In doing so, I hope to honor my
confidantes and communities with this study and expand on the hard fought gains the
strategic use of sexuality offered to us. Now I hope to demonstrate a pressing need to
limit its analytical application for the same reason.
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Chapter 2: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and the Subject of Sexuality

Introduction
In this chapter I examine how neoclassical economic philosophy parallels and
affects the sexological discourse of sexuality. “Sexology” is another name for the
scientific and psychological discourse of sex and sexuality that began in the late 19th
century and continues to today. Neoclassical economic philosophy also began in the late
19th century and continues to today. I aim to understand the historical development of
sexuality as a gendered and classed economic philosophy of the body. Sexuality should
not be understood as biological or psychological precondition of being human, but
instead can be understood as a social order emerging from particular social anxieties and
class struggles. I develop this perspective to further contribute to a critical and historical
perspective on sexuality. I also offer this as a reply to materialist feminist critiques that
contend Foucault did not adequately develop gendered and class-based perspectives in
his work on sexuality. I also hope to contribute to an interdisciplinary crossing by
applying critical discourse analysis to historical economic literature.
In this chapter, I will first address contemporary concern that critical discourse
analysis does not adequately address actual economic literature. I aim to correct that
herein. I then examine an economic human subjectivity that emerges in classical political
economy. Classical political economists first establish economic precepts of a natural
ordered economy, the “free market,” and develop the first notions of a gendered (male),
rational, economic agent. I address these developments before turning to focus on the
neoclassical “revolution” in economic philosophy and its overlap with sexological
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discourses of sexuality. I will argue that this neoclassical revolution deeply parallels and
affects the sexological invention and construction of sexuality. I do not imply that
neoclassical economic literature caused the development of sexuality. I will accentuate,
though, that sexologists construct sexuality with similar terms, ideals, and a remarkably
similar subjectivity. I will note how sexuality can be understood as a gendered and classbased capitalist economic philosophy of the body. Contemporary criticism of sexuality
rarely accounts for parallels between the historical construction of sexuality and the
historical construction of human subjectivity in economic literature. I hope to fill in some
of this missing account.
I am heavily indebted to the work of Lawrence Birken for first bringing the
parallels between economic history and sexology to light in Consuming Desire: Sexual
Science and the Emergence of a Culture of Abundance [1988]. Despite the brilliance of
his work, Birken too hastily dismisses Foucault‟s emphasis on sexuality as social control.
I will advocate that the construction of sexuality should be understood as a virulent class
struggle over bodies and pleasures. Sexuality is developed to institute a vision of an
economical and proper use of pleasure and affection against a normative sexuality that is
gendered and classed. This critical examination will further illuminate sexuality,
therefore, as an economic-capitalist discourse primarily concerned with instituting the
role of a naturalized, patriarchal, and rational masculinity (first developed in classical
political economy) but expressing the unlimited desires and pleasures that must be
judiciously managed by a normative, upper-class male. Only “he” is capable of such
discernment. Intensification of interest and surveillance of “deviant” and “perverse”
bodies, pleasures, and affections are rooted in these class-based social struggles and take
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pernicious form in the beginning of the neoclassical economic era during the late 19th and
early 20th century.
Sexuality is a rubric of bourgeois desire for political and economic rule, and
further justification for inequitable economic conditions. Yet the neoclassical era also
represents a radical expansion of economic opportunity, and the development of
individuated ideals of desire and pleasure for all consumers. I want to show that the
sexological development of sexuality reflects this social transformation, but quixotically
also serves to manage the anxieties this social transformation produces. Sexuality is
maintained as a master narrative to silence and subjugate other knowledge about the
pleasures and affections of the working classes, migrating classes, women, and other
urban denizens. Sexologists work feverishly to catalog and document sexual difference,
but also continually assert a classed and gendered sexual norm, even as its actual
possibility seems to recede further and further away from a material reality.

Parallel Criticism: Critical Discourse Analysis and Economic Literature
Economic philosophies pertain to the “economy” but also offer insight into the
paradigmatic intellectual and social climates of their time. Economic philosophies
provide a looking glass into the prevailing concerns and conditions of material life. For
this reason I attempt to unbraid a small section of the tightly wound rope of economic
philosophy to understand the establishment of a classical and neoclassical economic
subjectivity. Social constructionist theories of sexuality account for changes in social
institutions, variations in ideas about human subjectivity, and map parallels between
discourses. In contrast, some cultural criticism offers sexuality as a pathway to economic
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and social freedom, and a way out of capitalist repression. This model of liberation
follows from psychological discourses of sexual repression (Freud 1975; Reich 1963;
Marcuse 1966).
Debates in literary and cultural theory critically engage economic terms. These
debates employ and deconstruct numerous tropes, concepts, and metaphors shared in
classical and neoclassical economic philosophies (e.g. economy, libidinal economy,
circulation, desire, consumption, energy, and capitalism). Analysis of the economy and
economic literature, however, mostly run in separate veins. It is as if two worlds exist:
one in which economics is performed and one in which economics is critiqued
(McCloskey 1998; McCloskey et al 1988).
Jack Amariglio and David F. Ruccio reflect on the seeming incommensurability
of economic criticism and economic practice when recalling a 1990‟s conference of
cultural theorists and academic economists (Amariglio and Ruccio 1999:381-400). The
conference attendees attempted to seek mutual understanding and interdisciplinary
knowledge about active terminologies. They attempted to share new concepts to further
enable Marxist and political economic critiques of the existing economy. The attendees
asked how criticism of globalization and economic crises could proceed from shared
critical strategies in both cultural study and economic theory. This conference instead
ended with head scratching and frustration (1999:381-383). By attending the conference,
participants hoped to avoid this type of disciplinary isolation, but it still emerged in the
end (1999:385). In reflection, Amariglio and Ruccio narrate three important points that I
consider before applying critical discourse analysis to economic literature (1999:381385).
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First, economic debate in the so-called real discipline (academic economic
departments) and cultural criticism do share theoretical orientations about the dilemmas
of language and representation in the history of economic thought (for example: value,
price, money, culture). This should be recognized more often. Second, both neoclassical
economists and cultural critics establish and re-establish certain essentialisms in their
work (establishing “capitalism” as necessarily pervasive and determining, tropes of
commodity circulation, and tropes of circulating desire). In other words, both rely on
certain naturalized ideals about economic human subjectivity to advance their arguments.
Finally, Amariglio and Ruccio find more shared ground between economists and critical
theorists: they both introduce a “desiring body” in political economic critique, and both
share an interest in the subjectivity of the economic “man” (Amariglio and Ruccio
1999:385-394).
I detail these points to demonstrate that economists and cultural critics retain a
commitment to a similar pleasure-oriented human subjectivity. They also address the
subjective meaning of fulfilling desire (albeit to radically different ends). Both economic
philosophy and cultural criticism narrate strategies for more effectual economic thinking
and political practice. Economic literature is perhaps not the “sexiest” literature to
examine but, with a bit of irony here, it may be the sexiest literature of all; sexologists
import economic epistemologies to help construct “sexuality.”
Popular parlance coins economics as “the miserable science” because economic
philosophies must contend with material life and scarcity. Sexuality is often envisioned
with quite opposite effects. Sexuality is popularly understood as a commentary on
pleasure and affection and the capacity of the human body to relish pleasurable
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experiences. In short, sexuality and economics seem separate, distinct, and incompatible
but they are not. Relating sexual pleasure to economics is often considered unromantic
and ruinous to sexuality (Tratner 2002; Baumeister and Vohs 2004; Francis 2008;
Regnerus and Uecker 2011). This supposed comparative limitation aroused my suspicion
and animates my study. Eve Ksofsky Sedgwick notes that cultural critics too often create
paranoid readings of texts (Sedgwick 2003). I do not want to make this error. I offer a
type of reparative reading that Sedgwick identifies and advocates: point out the
nourishing surprises and hopes that may be generated in reviewing and claiming
“sustenance from the objects of a culture—even of a culture whose avowed desire has
often been not to sustain them” (Sedgwick 2003:150-1). Envisioning sexuality as an
economic philosophy is reparative in this regard.
I propose sexuality as a fundamental economic philosophy of the body. This does
not diminish a vision of pleasure and affection as necessary and meaningful, but instead I
envision a new comprehension of sexuality and economic history, and in turn, other ways
to think about human subjectivity. I now turn to examine the human subjectivity that
emerges out of classical political economy before devoting the rest of this chapter to
parallels between neoclassical economic thought and sexological construction of
sexuality.

Classical Economic Subjectivity: Male, Rational, and Self-Interested
Presaging neoclassical economic philosophy, moral philosopher and classical
political economist Adam Smith recognized the realities and dilemmas of economic
systemization. He expressed great concern for potentially debasing conditions of labor
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and the development of ignorance among laborers. He expressed apprehension about
capitalist money men being the “scariest, nastiest” creatures in society, if not nature
(Pack 1991:147). Smith‟s An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1909 [1776]) still presented a marvelous vision of the laboring human. The skill,
flexibility, and productivity of the economic human are epitomized by a theory of a
natural division of labor. He marveled at this supposed natural organization of wage
labor. He celebrated the ongoing drive he conceived as simultaneously economic selfinterest and, curiously, self-love and social order (a theme Karl Marx later develops and
criticizes). Adam Smith understood the economy as an expression of natural law and
order. In similar ways, early classical economic philosophers drew deeply from the
developing themes in the natural sciences.
Natural sciences detailed the body as well-organized and with specialized detail,
but functioning in a physiological whole (Bicchieri 1988:104). This knowledge stood in
stark contrast to the supposed barbarism of past ages. Economists begin to detail the
market in similar terms. The economy is the epitome of good human work, but still
expressed revealed natural orders. Much is gained by those who act in their natural selfinterest (Smith 1909). Smith admits, however, that his new science stemmed from his
moral sentiments. In this regard, any variance that refuted the naturalized economy
disrupted the “mental harmony” of the economist as moral philosopher (Oakley 1994:19).
It useful to note that Smith‟s approach to the economy and capitalism “was strongly
psychological and he emphasized the subjectivist aspects of its procedures” (Oakley
1994:19). The economist aimed to reduce any disruption to this preconceived vision of
harmony. What did not fit could, and should, be explained away. For Smith, and other
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classical thinkers, the rule of self-interest revealed the interest of every citizen. This
symmetry led to more efficient markets, more refined divisions of labor, and greater
wealth for all. The invisible hand guided liberty, encouraged self-regulation, and
advanced freedom as one and the same.
John Stuart Mill later arrayed personal freedom as a buffer from a potential
tyrannical state in his 1859 treatise On Liberty (1996). Mill argued that human
subjectivity naturally strived for liberty. The guiding ethic is a Classical and Utilitarian
one: moral virtue is determined by consequences of actions. Utility is the maximization
of happiness through appropriate action. Human subjectivity acting in self-interest is
already a benevolent social force. Classical economist David Ricardo developed a labor
theory of value and imagined the economic human subject in comparison to “noble
savages” acting in their economic interest (1960 [1821]). Modern people are similarly
noble, and regardless of historical progress the self-interested subject still must contend
with some type of scarcity. Accordingly, the economic human competes for scarce
resources, even in a society of abundance (Ricardo 1960). The conditions of wage labor
expressed natural principles of order. Any questioning of miserable labor conditions is in
the unenviable position of questioning natural principles.
Classical economists like Smith, Ricardo, and Mill inscribed an estimation of
rationality throughout their economic literature. The moral philosophy of economics is
the natural order of the market, and suggested a benevolent absence of conflict between
self-interest and social interests. Smith, Mill, and Ricardo‟s economic philosophies did
not require a theory of mutual or personal affection, only the concept of utility as a
maximization of pleasure. But, all was not entirely well in this model of rational and
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fruitful abundance, and self-interest as social interest. Laborers seeking wages were both
necessary but a problem of population management and stoked fears about scarce
resources. Wage labor also stoked fears about a declining patriarchal family household:
“those who had fared well in the old patriarchal order were frightened by its looming
obsolescence, but even those whose stood to gain were threatened by new forms of
economic insecurity” (Folbre 2009:138-139). This patriarchal obsolescence was partly
mitigated by the emerging economic focus on a gendered and classed subject: the
individual male at the center of the classical economic philosophies even though women
and youths were also working throughout the economy (Folbre 2009:126-128).
Social theorist Jeremy Bentham (1961 [1789]) further developed a theory of
utility. He proposed a felicific calculus to comprehend a seeking of pleasure and
avoidance of pain. Bentham argued this calculus of pleasure and pain is the core of
human subjectivity. He seemed to doubt the naturalizing totality of earlier political
economic theories and he noted deficiencies in the concept of natural law: since a
requirement of utility accorded the greatest happiness for the greatest number, some
human subject must be left out of this greatest number. But Bentham‟s portrait of
subjectivity posed the human as a rational agent and determined the social body as a
necessary collection of humans acting in their self-interest (1961). Accordingly, humans
recognized the truth of who they are through judicious economic activity. For Bentham,
humans knew this to be naturally true and any attempt to undermine his theory of
economic utility is explained away as a quirk of utility. Pleasure is sought and pain is
avoided—there is no other subjective way.
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A distinctly gendered male economic rational subjectivity was first commented on
by John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. Adam Smith bestowed this man with little
benevolence, however, by famously noting that the baker and butcher did not bake and
butcher for their own pleasure but for self-interested reasons (Smith 1909:106-112). Mill
offered a similar sentiment in the essay “On the Definition of Political Economy, and on
the Method of Investigation Proper to It” (1874 [1844]): if it was not for man seeking
profit there would be no social order and no political economy of which to speak. A
noble man seeks profits, and employs every opportunity to do so. The seeking of profit,
the recognition of self-interest as social interest, and the valorization of the pursuits of
pleasure are gendered as naturally male pursuits. Mill furthers this distinction when
noting man is a “being who desires to possess wealth, and who is capable of judging the
comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (1874:v.38). Importantly, the
accumulation of wealth and the establishment of property rights were generally assumed
to be male-only social domains. Women and men also advocated for female inheritance
rights, but widespread development of new laws was not established until the 1850‟s
(Chused 1983). The classical economic subject is decidedly male and in the pursuit of
wealth.
Perhaps the most famed of classical political economists is Karl Marx. He
envisioned evolutionary economic orders advancing through historical eras. In Capital,
Marx (1990[1861]) critiqued capitalism‟s bleak conditions for laboring classes. He
argued that society is misled by the mystifications of capital. Labor value, a capitalistic
necessity, occluded a real economic subjectivity with an alienating capitalistic one.
Wealth is derived wealth from a worker‟s estranged labor. This is the delusion that
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capitalism offered according to Marx. Plainly, a worker will never earn what labor is
worth. The commodity produced is the desirable “object outside us” and desire expands
far beyond what is necessary for survival (Marx 1990:13). This illusion distanced
workers from their own vital life-force (1990:31-32). Real pleasure for the working class
will always be deferred. Real pleasure can only be attained when workers are not
alienated from their own productive brilliance and the products fashioned from their own
hands. The consumption of commodities stands in the place of actual fulfillment. Marx‟s
“commodity fetishism” explains the seemingly religious relationship between commodity
and worker that results in an abysmal false consciousness. This relationship inscribes a
“social hieroglyphic” that demands critical translation (1990:32). For Marx:
Culture really has only one parent, and that is labour—which for him is equivalent
to saying, exploitation. The culture of class society tends to repress this
unwelcome truth; it prefers to dream up for itself a nobler progenitor, denying its
lowly parenthood and imagining that it sprang simply from previous culture, or
from unfettered individual imagination. [Eagleton 2003:8]

Marx envisioned asymmetrical social and political conditions advancing toward continual
economic disequilibrium—a constant social crisis. This vision of the economy and the
human subjectivity contrasted with Smith, Mill, and Ricardo and even at their most
pessimistic they did not compare to Marx‟s withering critique.
Marx developed a potent and enduring conception of class analysis. He
illuminated the politics of economics that ordered classes for profit for ruling classes. He
engaged the ideals of revolution and resistance in significant ways that continue to guide
discussions of class-based inequalities today. For Marx, history is the record of class
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struggle. History remains dialectically material and teleological. The end of history is a
communist utopia emerging from total societal transformation (Marx and Engels 1967
[1888]). Because the natural subject of the economy is labor, labor alone contains seeds
of resistance to ideological abstractions. But ideology entrenched class, justified the
extraction of surplus labor value, and limited class consciousness and solidarity. Only the
multitude of these productive forces overcoming the ideology of capital produces the
necessary communist revolution (Marx and Engels 1967). For Marx and colleague
Friedrich Engels, “Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life”
(1977:155 [1845]).
Life is class struggle until the end of history. Until then the noble male worker
passes life resisting capitalism‟s shifting rationales for dismal class conditions and
capitalism‟s uncanny flexibility in disguising his natural solidarity with other workers.
Marx and Engels, despite their productive relationship, offered very little on the totality
of workers in the public sphere and less in regard to gender; they emphasized the male
subject like other classical economists. They offer even less on the strenuous, continuous,
and gendered work of feeding, clothing, cleaning, and caring for workers in the domestic
sphere. Nancy Folbre (1991) critiques this conception of the “unproductive housewife” as
does Ann Crittenden (2002) when she asks why mother‟s work “was disappeared”
through the social invention of the unproductive housewife and subsequent devaluation
of domestic work of all kinds. They both answer the question by focusing on the
development of rational economic “man” whose wage labor is imagined as the sole and
proper source of value. Interestingly, Crittenden notes that women “won” certain legal
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rights to custody of their children in the mid-19th century, but at the cost of being
perpetually isolated and devalued in the domestic sphere because of it.
I detailed these classical economic philosophies to establish how prior to the
neoclassical turn, economists already established an authoritative and prevailing human
subjectivity. This human subject is gendered as male. He is a rational and self-interested
social actor. This self-interest presented no social dilemma for these classical economists,
though, because rational self-interest was already goodly and benevolent social interest.
The male, rational economic subject could do no wrong. Any behavior was already
socially interested behavior. This economizing male was self-interested toward pleasure
and in avoidance of pain. Despite this celebrated vision of economic similitude, all is not
entirely well as Marx noted. His vision of economic subjectivity is decidedly gloomier
and haunted with exploitation behind closed factory doors (and this, in reality, included
males, females, and youths of all ages). Despite this, the celebrated classical economic
rational self-interested male pleasure seeker prevails to this day in certain degrees.
Neoclassical economic philosophy builds on this vision, despite the transformations in an
urban landscape offering very different material evidence of human life. I now devote the
remainder of this chapter to assessing the neoclassical economic revolution.
Neoclassical economists import the rational, gendered, self-interested, pleasureseeker and build an economic subject with all these characteristics, but with distinctly
new additions that reflect a new accounting of desire in a newly realized consumer
economy offering unlimited pleasures. Consumption becomes the central focus in
neoclassical philosophy and is guided by male consumers operating with a distinctly
psychological rationality and confronted with rational choices to make (Nelson 2006:1844

21). This is the neoclassical homo oeconomicus. After detailing these subjective
additions, I will show this economic subjectivity parallels sexological construction of
another type of human economic subjectivity—sexuality.

Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy
The neoclassical human subject is embedded with earlier classical political
economic theory of natural orders. The neoclassical human subject remains an entirely
natural creature, expressing little evidence of social conflict or scarcity. Neoclassical
economic subjectivity combined theories of bodies striving for pleasure and avoiding
pain, measured by an internal felicific calculus, and exercised through judicious
economic activity and consumption. This bestows an optimistic vision of human
subjectivity despite being crafted in the science of scarcity. Despite any grave economic
concern offered by classical political economy, naturalized ideals of economic
philosophy ameliorated much of it. The economic order was natural, after all.
After this neoclassical turn in economics in the late 19th century, all males of a
certain standing are assumed to behave in fully rational ways, because of their effort to
maximize personal utility, and with a new world of markets and commodities at their
fingertips (Nelson 2006:18-22). All necessary information for rational choice is assessed
by this economic agent, but hemmed by scarcity of desirable goods. This is professed by
neoclassical philosophy to still be in accordance with natural laws; self-interested
behavior is still good for all.
Neoclassical economist William Stanley Jevons (1957[1871]) further refined the
concept of utility as a composite of characteristics dependent on various human
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circumstances and human needs. Importantly, and central to the neoclassical revolution,
Jevons instilled commodities into the felicific calculus and discerned the weighing of
price and the consumption of commodities as an expression of pleasure warding off a
now distinctly psychological type pain. Accordingly, Jevons‟ theory of value determined
happiness as a necessary scaling of marginal utility through consumption. He notes that
“perhaps our attention is more fixed on the utility which we desire to secure than the
disutility from which we are trying to escape. Yet it would be difficult to deny that pain
constantly attends pleasure” (Jevons 1965:9 [1905]). This scale proposed decreased
satisfaction with every consumptive act—a scale of diminished returns weighed on every
pleasurable act of consumption. Jevons avoided the complexities of individual
expressions of utility. He quotes an English economist to note that “no man is satisfied
with so limited a range of enjoyment” (Jevons 1965:8). He instead composed the rational
man as an average man to base his theory and this average man. Economic humans
(average “men”) are happy subjects to the natural phenomenon of maximizing pleasure.
Of course, these average men were not the average laboring men, but the average upperclass men of his time concerned with pursuits of pleasure. He makes distinct that even
“immoral or criminal” objects have utility, and only ignorance would predicate utility
being hurtful, but this is still utility if one is ignorant of the hurtful part of the thing being
desired (Jevons1965:12). Desire is the key determinant of utility in this sense.
Contemporary feminist economists contest this gendered and classed version of
economic subjectivity (Duncan and Edwards 1997; Strober 1997:11). Kurt Rothschild
also notes that a reluctance to abandon this model in contemporary economics is fueled
by fear of being closer to the “fuzzy reality of man and society” (Rothschild 2001:450).
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The fuzzy reality of man and society also realizes that no man, no human, lives in a
gendered isolation. Classical economists established the gendered subject, and
neoclassical economic thinkers continued with the assumption that all human economic
activity pertained to male pursuits, despite the overwhelming and obvious evidence that
women worked in the private and the public sphere. This is especially the case for lower
and working class women who worked in both spheres. Folbre discusses how women
were paid less than half of men during this time and “this discrepancy was explained in
both natural and moral terms: women belonged in the home and should remain there”
(Folbre 2009:135-136). Economists‟ notions of separate, pure spheres of economic life
composed another economic fantasy that avoided more of the fuzzy reality of material
life.
Neoclassical economist Marie-Esprit Lèon Walras granted human subjectivity a
communal “we” in Elements of Pure Economics (1954[1877]). But he continued to
theorize human subjectivity as a rationally consumptive pursuit of utility maximization in
a perfectly competitive market. Walras thus theorized a “purity” of equilibrium in the
market. This theory proposed that prices fixed to utility (an early type of consumer
demand) in a setting of perfect competition. Economic purity now expressed nothing less
than the natural truth of scientific physics; the laws being formulated in the natural
sciences seemed perfectly suited for the economic rationalities offered in neoclassical
economics. Economic systems now guided natural energies and offered social
expressions of natural physical laws, as well as the bodily ones offered in earlier political
economic theories. “Pure” economics is the mother tongue of the neoclassical economic
revolution, and the tenets are still used today (Osteen & Woodmansee 1999:22-25).
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Neoclassical economists were not immune to the realities of 19th century material
reality. Despite idealistic visions they too were, to a degree, participating in a type of
anthropological accounting of the economy, as well theorizing its natural perfection. Carl
Menger offered that the human economic agent also struggled with forces of deprivation
and overstimulation in capitalism. This compounds a theory of utility and rationality that
delivers mostly subjective joy and satisfaction. In the 1871 text Principles of Economics,
Carl Menger invoked these extreme economic situations to demonstrate how humans act
within a marginal utility of diminishing satisfactions (1981[1871]). This is the beginning
of a utility that exists in accordance with falling satisfaction: a diminishing rate of
marginal utility. He even goes so far to note that “non-economic goods, therefore, not
only do not have exchange value…but not value at all, and hence no use value” (Menger
1981:118). In this sense, only economic commodities can be valued in any real sense.
Menger‟s ideal presented another diminution of the domestic sphere, and
disregarded other types of economic exchange. Menger then determined that rational
economic men “will prefer pleasure of longer duration to pleasures of shorter duration,
and with the same duration, pleasures of greater intensity to pleasures of less intensity”
(Menger 1981:123). Consumption is the ultimate point of the economy and of a
pleasurable life. The consumer of fine things with fine tastes is the radical new
individualized center of the consumptive economy. The holism of production erodes into
this individual consumer. The neoclassical system thus “implied that desire was the only
criterion for social agency” (Birken 1988:35). Unfortunately this does not carry over in
the same way to sexological discourse. Desire in the sexological scene comes to represent
a deviant distortion of social agency because of the multiplicity of possible desires.
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Menger also focused on varying human needs, subject to the individual and not
solely based on objective forms of universal pleasure. Only human desires dictate any
value as “human knowledge of the different degrees of importance of satisfaction of
different needs and of separate acts of satisfaction is also the first cause of differences in
the values of goods” (Menger 1981:128[1871]). This subjective theory of value marked a
further transformation in economic philosophy. And Menger provided further
philosophical sustenance for the neoclassical model of consumption as only necessary
locus of economic energy. Menger also imagined this capitalistic order as an evolutionary
form of development (he termed it spontaneous). The economy accordingly was an
evolutionary order and thus subject to some scarcity and conflict. His philosophy then
composed a subjectivity that was decidedly psychological in its orientation, and
composed of individual wants, needs, and desires but hemmed by this evolutionary
realization that all could not be met. Bentham‟s calculus first provided the framework for
a psychological wedding of desire with utility (Birken 1988) and Menger built his
philosophy out of this.

Troubling Bodies: Neoclassical Economic Philosophy and Sexology
During the late 19th century, hundreds upon thousands of bodies were arriving in
urbanizing and industrializing centers to pursue work. This sparked another intellectual
project: sexology. During the neoclassical economic transformation, sexologists also
constructed a portrait of human subjectivity that paralleled economic philosophy in
startling and, I suggest, not coincidental ways. Despite the marvelous testaments of
economic social order in classical and neoclassical economic philosophy, the urban
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spaces were teeming and chaotic. I compare the themes within sexology and neoclassical
philosophy to demonstrate similar constructions of subjectivity. Sexuality should thus be
understood as a 19th and early 20th century economic philosophy of the body. Sexologists
also work, though, to disrupt and subjugate other knowledge of pleasure and affection
emerging from the same economic milieu.
Sexologists Sigmund Freud, Havelock Ellis, Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Magnus
Hirschfeld, and Iwan Bloch all developed a sexological subjectivity during the 19th and
20th century with the belief that they were discovering pure, natural essences applicable
to all human beings. Krafft-Ebing‟s staggeringly influential work Psychopathia Sexualis
(1965[1894]) composed human sexual subjectivity as a striving male “achieving” a
natural purity in heterosexuality (after a few perverted bumps in the road, of course).
Females, on the other hand, were less striving, at least not in the same sense: “A
particular species of excessive sexual urge may be found in females in whom a most
impulsive desire for sexual intercourse with certain men imperatively demands
gratification” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:5). Sexuality is the terrain of a male, individual,
rational pursuit of pleasure in a changing social milieu. This model man is the
mythologized “benevolent patriarch” within economic subjectivity (Strassman 1993:5468) and forms the foundation of sexologists‟ construction of sexuality. It is useful to ask
how sexologists composed an ideal sexuality, all the while locating and mining evidence
of perversions, sexual deviations, and cultural anomaly. Sexologists gathered evidence
that pointed to a vast and rich milieu of sexual cultures, yet a natural, stable, and rational
subjectivity is simultaneously constructed to render any other interpretation moot.
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A classed and gendered portrait of this economic milieu is offered by John D‟
Emilio in “Capitalism and Gay Identity” (1997). European and American household
economies underwent major alterations during the 19th and 20th century. The industrial
capitalist mode of production transformed the local, agriculturally based household
member into an urban-bound wage earner. D‟Emilio emphasizes that through
proletarianization, urbanization, and the expansion of wage labor, an “ideology of family
life and the meaning of heterosexual relations” are profoundly altered
(D‟Emilio1997:170). He notes that household economies relied on the reproduction of
new members for agricultural and household labor. Sexual expression was accordingly
coupled to marriage. In earlier Puritan American communities laws restricted anyone
from living outside family households (D‟Emilio1997:170). A notion of “heterosexual
expression [as] means of establishing intimacy, promoting happiness, and experiencing
pleasure” first develops within the demands of an industrializing economy.
This economy also provided the space and conditions for identities based on
same-sex sex affection to develop (D‟Emilio1997:171) as well as other gendered,
classed, and diverse forms of pleasure and affection. In other words, sexual behavior that
constitutes identity today did not always ground identity in the past. Jonathan Ned Katz
notes that heterosexual relations are not even yet “heterosexual” in the mid-19th century.
The very concept of hetero- and homo- distinctions based on sex acts, not to mention
identities, are not coined until writer and social reformer Karl Maria Kertbeny includes
them in a private letter in 1868 (Katz 1997:177). It is essential to note this decade is also
the marker of the neoclassical philosophical transformation.
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D‟Emilio and Katz‟s historical analyses point to a historical emergence of a
“normal” sexuality. They remind readers that heterosexuality was constructed and
implemented to help interpret and re-organize social life undergoing these profound
material transformations. Despite the rapid implementation of heterosexuality as normal
during this time, it carried the stigma of deviancy as “morbid perversion” well into the
early 20th century (Katz 1997:177-178). That is to say, sex based on heterosexual
pleasure could also be a moral perversion if there was too much of it. This idea eroded as
other deviancies piqued the interest of sexologists. Foremost, though, sexologists
grappled with composing a philosophical basis for a universal and natural theory to
ground their discoveries of divergent sexual cultures and divergent forms of pleasure and
affection. They “discovered” sexuality.
Sexologists, as much as economists, were observing radically different ways of
life (and sexual cultures) within the industrializing and urbanizing spaces, and they both
attempted to account for this diversity with an economic subjectivity in mind. As Iwan
Bloch considered in the disturbingly named Anthropological Studies in the Strange
Sexual Practices of all Races in All Ages: Ancient and Modern, Oriental and Occidental,
and Primitive and Civilized (1933), almost every person has variations of desire and he
worried that “sexual relations usually considered normal, as in these too we can
demonstrate a progressive need for stronger stimulant” (Bloch 1933:167). This is
strikingly similar to the estimation of an economic diminishing utility. Apparently,
though, this is more of a problem among “all places in which great numbers of people are
crowded together furnish conditions conducive to the genesis of transgressions and
aberrations of a hetero- and homosexual character” (1933:176). Importantly for my
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emphasis on class Bloch continues to note that in “worker‟s tenements, where often a
whole family lives in one room, the children early have an opportunity to witness scenes
of the grossest vice, especially where there are also lodgers” (1933:176). Bloch continues
to cast his net even among the middle and upper classes, by noting that “sexual
perversion, especially of a homosexual nature, occurring later in life, can be traced to the
years spent in boarding school” (Bloch 1933:178). Bloch ignored that there are few other
options in boarding school for other conduits of pleasure and affection, but he noted that
at least these are artificially fostered compared to other more inborn perversions, like
among basically every other culture and “race” on earth which he details with relish.
Like Jeremy Bentham, who examined concerns about the ironic deficiencies of
natural laws, sexologist Richard Von Krafft-Ebing surmised that natural sexual and
gender deficiencies required political intervention to achieve a more natural state of
humankind. Krafft-Ebing proposes in Psychopathia Sexualis (1965 [1894]) that all sexual
abnormalities must be rooted in a similar pathological-psychological continuum and must
be confronted in an attempt rehabilitate resulting immoralities. Sexuality, Krafft-Ebing
noted, is the “most powerful factor in individual and social existence” (1965:3). Bentham
argued that any effort, thoughtful or otherwise, to discount or dismiss the principle of
utility among individuals is futile—for any effort to diminish its truth is evidence of its
natural truth (Bentham 1961:19-21[1789]). For Krafft-Ebing, any dismissal of the power
of sexuality over men dismissed a necessary moral heterosexuality. He argued that moral
heterosexuality was necessary for taming animal passions. Without it there is no
foundation for civilization. Sexual subjectivity holds the seeds of civilization and chaos.
His construction of normal sexual subjectivity required manly, judicious, constant,
53

felicific oversight, just like the economic subjectivity of classical and neoclassical
philosophy. Women were clearly of less concern, as Krafft-Ebing decided women are by
“nature not as sensual and certainly not as aggressive in the pursuit of sexual needs”
(1965:262[1894]). In either case, even love is suspicious because “purely sensual love is
never true or lasting, for which reason first love is, as a rule, but a passing infatuation a
fleeting passion” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:7). Sensual pleasure was to be limited as it
instigated the very desires that were already coursing through psychology and sexology,
borrowed from neoclassical philosophies, and paralleled new ideas about an economy
filled with consumer goods that must all be desired. The economy now depended on it.
Desire may be natural, but is also naturally dangerous without a gendered and classed
intellect to govern it.
For many early sexologists, rational and judicious men provided the necessary
and proper oversight of sexuality. The difference between men and women is stark: “In
the sexual demands of man‟s nature will be found the motives of his weakness toward
women. He is enslaved by her, and becomes more and more dependent on her as he
grows weaker, and the more he yields to sensuality” (Krafft-Ebing 1965:9). This
resistance to sensuality was assumed to be a natural duty over less-worthy men, women,
and children. If men are incapable or unwilling, then women may play some role and
prove their “worth.” Ann Laura Stoler notes how the “triumph of the rational bourgeois
man in colony and metropole” rendered both women and non-Europeans into a category
governed not by rationality, but by animal passions (1995:128-130). Yet women were
still expected to oversee men of their “race” from mingling with native women. This
certainly illuminates sexual subjectivity as a type of social control; as Stoler remarks on
54

the colonies, “more than half the European male population were cohabiting out of
wedlock with native women in the late 19th century” (1995:129). These colonial
encounters produced social pressures at home that roused sexologists‟ efforts.
This pattern offers a critical insight into the sexologists‟ effort to account for all
sex behavior coordinated by a single, universal, and naturalizing (and anthropological
logic in Iwan Bloch‟s cases): “Time and again, one finds sexological writing—all the
way from the 1890s to today—seeking to produce some everlasting truth about the sexual
capacity of human beings” (Bristow 2011:15). Accordingly, a rational man acting in his
own best interest while searching out and weighing the pleasures in life, but with
diminishing returns, provides sexology with a compelling psychological composite to
building the sexual subject. In addition it offered sexologists a normative model from
which to theorize all other pleasures and affections as perversion, inversions, and
deviations.
So, despite, the newly available bodies, desires for commodities, evidence of
various pleasure and affections, sexologists and economists were both keen to develop an
interior, psychological world to justify limits and order on the dissonance, diversity, and
contradictions in material reality. John F. Tomer details how the economic man remained
“self-interested, rational, unchanging, separate, and unreflective” (2001:281). His
assessment could just as well be detailing the sexological development of normative
sexuality.
Sexologists demonstrate an intense interest in punitive and rehabilitative sanctions
for sexual, laboring “others” as much as they demonstrate naturalist interest in creating
taxonomies of sexual perversion and normalcy. Effort to comprehend and systematize
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behaviors, cultures, and acts is not a benign 19th and 20th century naturalistic exercise.
Accordingly, sexologists do not simply hope to find order in the 19th and 20th century
urban landscape; they endeavor to enforce a capitalist social order as well. Neoclassical
economists, at least, argued the economy was a natural order; sexologists went one
further and worked to warn, display, and cajole upper-class men and some women into a
perceived natural order that was apparently falling apart before their discerning eyes. As
with any attempt at social order and control, these efforts have mixed results.
Sexologists like Krafft-Ebing (1965[1894]), Bloch (1933, 1936[1909]), and
Hirschfeld (2000[1919]) already speculated a sexualized capitalistic human subject when
they developed a sexual subjectivity. They enforced a masculinist, familial, and
psychological framing of the sexual subject through the newly refined category of
sexuality. The sexological “scientific” endeavor can and should be understood as a class
struggle. The master narrative of sexuality subsumes other pleasures and affections that,
as Katz (1997, 2001) and D‟Emilio (1997) noted, were as “natural” as the environments
they were taking shape in.
Differences in class standings made bodies available for sexological discernment.
The evidence of “perversions” was ascertained by the upper and bourgeois intellectual
classes simply through observing the different cultural traditions and practices of the
working classes. This was all the evidence they needed to recoil in horror. Police,
reformers, doctors, and politicians were armed with the incipient knowledge from
sexological discourse to justify sanctions, class punishments, and other efforts of
confinement or rehabilitation. Of course “deviants” and those who occupied the upper
classes were not immune to each other. Upper classes certainly mingled in the blue hour
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of twilight and in the back alleys of clubs, bars, and other establishments of so-called illrepute.
The intellectuals of modernity were deeply concerned with the ability of social
science to find parallels to the “laws” of natural science (Hobsbawm 1975) as much as
economists. Sexologists imagined that understanding natural foundations bodily and
behavioral differences (which would encapsulate gender differences and sexual behavior
in this time) were the keys to unlocking and controlling the diverse sexual phenomena
observed and reported in the urban landscape. All the while, upper class and bourgeois
intellectuals were already haunted by notions of their own failed moralities. This duality
is described by Eric Hobsbawm in The Age of Capital 1848-1875:
The duality of matter and spirit implied a hypocrisy which unsympathetic
observers considered to be not merely all-pervasive but a fundamental
characteristic of the bourgeois world. Nowhere was this more obvious, in the
literal sense of being visible, than in the matter of sex. This is not to imply that the
mid-nineteenth-century (male) bourgeois (or those who aspired to be like him)
was merely dishonest, preaching one morality while deliberately practicing
another, though patently the conscious hypocrite is more often to be found where
the gap between the official morality and the demands of human nature is
unbridgeable, as in this period it often was. [1975:232-233]

Efforts to bridge the gap between the so-called private moralities and the public
experiences of bourgeois male citizens certainly stimulated the discourses that took sex as
the object of inquiry. Sex, and the bodies performing its variations in streets, bars, clubs,
balls, and houses of prostitution (Katz 1997) provided the empirical evidence necessary,
and indeed a moral necessity for gentlemen and gentlewomen to support sexual and
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economic sanctions, whether they participated in “deviant" sex or not. This class struggle
fueled sexual sanctions and punishments, and these were imposed on diverse working
class sexual cultures in cities and towns across the US, Europe, and the colonies and
under various guises (Boag 2003; Stoler 1995; Jackson 1996; D‟Emilio1997; Halperin
1990; Katz 1997, 2001; Chauncey 1994; Rupp 2002; Faderman 1991). It is evident in
Bloch‟s assertion that many alarming possibilities are instigated by the “sexual impulse.”
But these sexual potentials can be judiciously resisted and elevated from the “transient”
and “casual” to limit the poisoning of the “amatory life of our time; let us destroy all the
germs of degeneration, and let us imprint upon our sexual conscience three words—
health, purity, responsibility” (1936:765[1909]).
Certainly pleasures and affections and bodies are organized and managed in other
places and other times. But sexuality is a unique construction: sex as a behavior or simple
capacity for pleasure is transformed into ontological categories of personhood and
deviancy during the late 19th and early 20th century through sexological efforts (Foucault
1978; Cameron and Kulick 2003:19-24; Seidman 2003; Rubin 1984; Halperin 1990;
Weeks 1991; Katz 1997:177-180). This emergent discourse should be understood as
precipitated by class anxiety and class struggle. I remind my reader that sexuality is
highly suited for class control because the rationale that discursively operates within it
already incorporates a class-based economic subjectivity. Yet, sexuality was socially
imagined to be distinct from economic consideration. Feminist thinker Margaret Jackson
attempts to understand the sexological literature of this time and comes to a similar
conclusion with gendered implications:
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Sexology was about much more than legitimizing myths; it was also about
constructing a model of sexuality which purported to be objective and
scientific but in fact reflected and promoted the interests of men in a
sexually divided society. [1987:52]

Similar to racial typologies also circulating (Somerville 1994) during this new economic
order, the supposed natural laws for bodily and behavioral differences reinforced classed
political concerns and a maintenance of power through the new vector of sexuality.
Sexuality came to serve as a key determinant in understanding people‟s relation to
nature, to each other, and to the social whole. Sexologists offered then a vector for
determining “truth” about pleasure, affection, and agency divorced from economic
consideration (Birken 1988:7). Sexuality encompassed a new phase of naturalized
individualism but also compatible with technologies that enforce certain relations and
affections. “In this context, sexology takes on a particularly titanic significance because it
appears as the last line of defense against a universal democratization and dissolution of
the social order” (Birken 1988:13). After Birken establishes this point, he retreats by
critiquing Foucault for a failure to recognize the “two-sided and contradictory nature” of
the social control exercised by sexual science (1988:14). This analysis is specious given
that Foucault‟s entire oeuvre of work painstakingly details the ongoing production of
power through constellation-like dimensions of discursive production (Foucault 1978;
Weeks 1991:162-166; Foucault, Martin, et al 1988:126-131). Discourse may censor, but
only with the aim of producing other refined techniques for inquiring about sex—this is
the open secret of sexuality in Western thought. Sexual discourse is not repressive, it is
productive.
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Sexuality provided class-based intellectual weaponry to enforce certain relations
between social members for the benefit of ruling classes. Sexologists constructed sexual
subjectivity with economic subjectivity to help reconcile “the contradictory structure of
an ideology simultaneously embodying both productivist and consumerist values”
(Birken 1988:40). In other words, sexuality covers contradictory evidence emerging from
a materially changing society. Cultural bodies, pleasures, and affections also expressed
these changes in dynamic sexual cultures. Sexologists understood sexuality to naturally
order energy, needs, and impulses. This was considered normal for male, heterosexual,
rational patriarchs, but intensely problematic for everyone else.
Sexologist Havelock Ellis imagined sexual impulses moving along three
trajectories, “the immediate discharge of masturbation…discharge of so-called perversion
…and the long delayed discharge he believed inherent in normal or heterogenital love”
(Birken 1988:42). This gave a new meaning to “waiting until marriage.” A metaphor of
hydraulic desire dominated his account of sexuality. Masturbation is not ideal, so if
consumption is not realized then symptoms of perverse sexuality emerge. A symptomatic
sexuality is anything other than a normal mapping of economic masculinity. Theories of
perverse and deviant pleasure were assumed by sexologists to carry natural frustrations
emerging from a scarcity of desirable objects to consume. Deviant affections are cases of
falling marginal satisfaction. Deviant pleasures are signs of failed utility and indicative of
failed economic consumption by irrational men. Sexologists navigated between
addressing the natural order of perverse sexualities, while offering some promise of
rehabilitation based on accounts of neoclassical economic subjectivity. This is the
sexological prescription we maintain as sexuality.
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Krafft-Ebing‟s (1965 [1894]) composite of sexual desire proposed a potentially
dangerous quantity of desire, which no less than all of civilization must work to contain.
Subsequently, what sexological discourse offered the sexual deviant were theoretical
prescriptions and cures only through other fulfilled desires, or the slight possibility that
cravings would eventually erode, or hopefully get explained by a future theory of natural
bodily defects (Dean 1996:20). So, once the deviant was ensnared either by police, the
concerned husband, the psychologist, the reformer, or the moral vice squad, there was no
way out of the sexological system of sexuality.
Bloch‟s (1936[1909]) other opus Sexual Life of Our Time: In Its Relations to
Modern Civilization also sets out on the bourgeois adventure of making universal and
natural meaning out of cases of sexual perversions. He offered neoclassical economic
therapy as bodily cure. Bloch valiantly attempted, through twisted logic, to salvage
masturbation as natural until it was morbidly expressed by “individuals who are
previously morbid” (1936:411). Similar to sexology‟s general inability to “locate the
sexual definitively in the body” (Dean 1996:21), Bloch struggled to make the case that
sexual perversions, gender differences, prostitution, and enjoyment of pornography are
definitive bodily disorders. He instead employed sexuality as an obvious backdrop and
self-evident justification for these moral perversions. In any case, his estimation of
himself and his class is evident in the following warning about pornography and erotica:
These obscene writings may be compared with natural poisons, which also must
be carefully studied, but which can be entrusted only to those who are fully
acquainted with their dangerous effects, who know how to control and counteract
these effects, and who regard them as an object of natural research by means of
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which they will be enabled to obtain an understanding of other phenomena.
[Bloch 1936:734]

The right men with the right mind do not need to protect themselves, they just need to
know they can.
In this chapter, I explained how sexological discourse constructed sexuality in
parallel to economic philosophy. Like neoclassical economic philosophy, sexologists
appealed to a theory of desire that mirrored economic man and employed similar ideals,
like a marginal utility of desire and consumption. Sexologists composed human sexual
subjectivity as distinctly rational, male, self-centered, and upper-class. Sexuality also
served to increase the construction and categorization of perversions. Sexologists also
elaborated theories of sexuality that aimed to explain and possibly rehabilitate deviants it
perceived in the newly modernized world. An outlet for normal desire must be found,
hopefully in the (normal) coitus of heterosexual expression, but the outlook is never
good. Perhaps in frustration, sexologists‟ “concern with deviance grew more obsessive”
(Dean 1996:8) and necessitated a psychological explanation:
This shift in focus away from sexual practices to the psychology of perversions
was consistent with a general transfer of interest from the consequences of acts to
their causes, from the description of behavior to a preoccupation with the
impulses that drive it. [Dean 1996:19]

Sexological theory paralleled and always depended on neoclassical notions of economic
man and his supposed desires; there is a necessity in realizing sexual pleasure, but only in
a rational, male, economizing way. I argue that sexologists retained this human economic
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subjectivity by placing rational, self-interested, upper-class male consumers at the center
of a supposedly universal human sexual subjectivity. They named this sexuality.
Finally, I attempted to demonstrate that class-based anxieties and class struggle
motivated sexological research and facilitated the construction and idealization of
sexuality. In another case of frustrated utility, late-19th century and early-20th century
sexologists are never able to contain or rehabilitate what they document (either through
documentation, or later, therapeutic psychology). Sexologists attempt, and fail, to render
deviant bodies and desires theoretically stable, ahistorical, and universal as much as
economists failed to capture all the material realities and account for the fluctuations in
the political economy. Yet, sexology magnificently succeeded in establishing and
concretizing an immaterial and supposedly non-economic ideal of sexuality as a natural
expression of all humanity.
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Chapter 3: Queering Anthropology

Introduction
In this chapter I examine how cultural anthropologists and queer theorists contest
sexual identity, sexual orientation, and sexuality as a universal, natural, and non-material
frame for understanding bodies, pleasure, affection, and agency. I will demonstrate,
however, that sexuality remains a problematic analytical category for queer
anthropological research. The use of sexuality to address, explain, or frame knowledge is
limiting and certainly, as I will show in this chapter, unnecessary.
As I noted in the Introduction, Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000)
exhort social and cultural scholars to pay close attention to distinctions between
“categories of practice” and “categories of analysis.” Social actors and social
organizations use categories of practice to make sense of everyday situations and create
cohesive meaning and understanding in social relations. This does not necessitate use of
the same categories for social analysis (2000:5-6). The distinction between categories is
instrumental in helping me understand why cultural theorists and queer anthropologists
need to employ sexuality to engage with their informants through categories of practice.
For instance, research informants will use the category of sexuality (and sexual identities
like gay, lesbian, straight, and other locally related terms) to explain and describe their
beliefs and experiences (Bérubé 1990; Boellstorff 2005; Lewin 1993; Newton 1979;
Weston 1991), and researchers will use these accounts to develop histories and
ethnographies of cultural practice (Cameron and Kulick 2003; Escoffier 1998; Duberman
et al 1989; Faderman 1991; Gallo 2006; Herdt 1992; Johnson 2004; Katz 1976; Newton
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1993). Following Brubaker and Cooper (2000), this does not necessitate the use of
sexuality as a category of analysis. In establishing sexuality as neoclassical economic
philosophy of the body, I hope this further stresses the need to reconsider the continual
deployment of sexuality in queer anthropological work. I believe my argument can and
should problematize the use among other disciplinary analyses of sexuality (Carver and
Mottier 1998; Jónasdóttier et al 2011; Kimmel and Plante 2004; Oleksy 2009; Sinfield
2004; Williams 2006). I find the continual use of sexuality to be especially troubling,
though, within the union of anthropological and queer theory.
I refer to the union of anthropological and queer theory as “queer anthropology.”
This union is considered relatively recent in academic institutions, but as Gayle Rubin
notes this is more a product of amnesia about “Queer Studies‟s past [sic]” than a new
disciplinary crossing (2011:354-355). A foreshadow of an explicitly queer theory in
cultural anthropology is not widely acknowledged until Kath Weston‟s (1993) article
“Lesbian/Gay Studies in the House of Anthropology.” This is followed more than a
decade later by Tom Boellstorff‟s (2007b) “Queer Studies in the House of
Anthropology.” In this chapter, I will accentuate how both social and cultural
anthropologists and queer theorists confronted similar, significant intellectual dilemmas
prior to the official recognition of queer anthropology (at least by academic theorists and
academic institutions). I then briefly review three criticisms of cultural anthropological
knowledge and then introduce materialist criticism of queer theory. I compare how
cultural anthropologists and queer theorists attempt to account for human subjectivity
within social constructions (like “sexuality”) and still make sense of human social
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agency, resistance to domination of life-ways filled with affective alliances and bodily
pleasures.
Simply, how are human sexual subjects understood as cultural compositions and
also as vibrant confirmations of social savvy and social resistance? This is no simple task;
I attend to this dilemma and am prompted to employ “new” theories of queer
anthropological sexual subjectivity for this work. This dilemma is explicit in queer
theory: how can we study social construction and simultaneously assess social and
political agency (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004)? Queer theories propose self-conscious
attempts to change thinking about social life and encourage resistance to forms of sexual
and gender injustice. I address this pursuit of a holistic sexual subjectivity mapped above
social and historical specificity as a fertile “queer dilemma.”
I celebrate the achievements of queer anthropology (so far) but remain deeply
troubled by an overall reliance on sexuality to frame both ends of this dilemma. Queer
anthropologists assemble theories carefully, and even lovingly, in an attempt to
understand pleasure and agency in material, political, and lived ways. The effort
considers ways to also comprehend, then contest, the discourses of Western sexuality as
necessarily universal and meaningful for all humans everywhere—at all times. In doing
so, queer theorists and cultural anthropologists attempt to contest the supposed
psychological, universal sexual subject. In short, how do humans embody culture and
also generate cultural change? There is a call for “queer ethic” in sexual cultural study
that can also compose a practical ground for queer theoretical knowledge (Warner 1999,
2012; Crosby, Duggan, and Ferguson et al 2012; Tapley 2012). I believe cultural
ethnography can answer this call if it attends more closely to it analytical assumptions
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when deploying sexuality. In this way, I hope to expand on what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick
offered when thinking—queerly—of other theoretical possibilities for social and cultural
research and political economic criticism:
That‟s one of the things that “queer” can refer to: the open mesh of possibilities,
gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and excesses of meaning when
the constituent elements of anyone‟s gender, of anyone‟s sexuality aren‟t made
(or can‟t be made) to signify monolithically. The experimental linguistic,
epistemological, representational, political adventures attaching to the very many
of us who may at times be moved to describe ourselves as (among many other
possibilities) pushy femmes, radical faeries, fantasists, drags, clones, leatherfolk,
ladies in tuxedos, feminist women or feminist men, masturbators, bulldaggers,
divas, Snap! queens, butch bottoms, storytellers, transsexuals, aunties, wannabes,
lesbian-identified men or lesbians who sleep with men, or…people able to relish,
learn from, or identify with such. [Sedgwick 1993:8]

This queer mesh of possibility supports experimental and counterintuitive ways of
thinking about human sexual subjectivity. This offers a creatively porous backdrop from
which to criticize and think about sexuality.
Lastly, in this chapter, I examine recent developments in queer anthropology. I
argue that despite brilliant contestations of sexuality, explicit maintenance of sexuality as
a category of analysis constrains anthropological and queer holistic visions of sex as
material and agentive (and culturally and locally specific). A more complete
deconstruction of sexuality is necessary even here—a critical analysis that should
emphasize sexuality as a limiting framework for interpreting and explaining material
bodies and pleasures. This limitation hinders more radical political thinking about
pleasure, agency, and material life.
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I then note a final queer dilemma: does dismissing neoclassical-inspired human
rationality produce an insurmountable obstacle to theorizing human pleasure-oriented
subjectivity? Namely, does criticizing a rational economic human subjectivity block
possibilities for theorizing sexual subjectivity as social agency? If we hope to address
human subjects as rational, material, sexual subjects are we limited in our effort, from the
start, by an over-reliance on criticisms of economic rationality? I explore this final queer
dilemma, before addressing Out in Theory: The Emergence of Gay and Lesbian
Anthropology (Leap and Lewin 2002) and concluding this thesis.

Anthropological Queerness
The subject of anthropology is the human, and the human is a cultural being. The
anthropological human subject embodies both culture and cultural change. Determining
what “culture” is, does, and can be ultimately traces dense and arguable boundaries
between empirical science, history, and political theory. Anthropological culture is
conceived as human social behavior: a complex whole of belief and practice. Kate
Crehan assesses that cultures “are in some sense patterned wholes… fundamental to the
anthropological notion of culture as a „way of life‟, however that may have been
understood” (2002:42). Culture is understood in diverse ways. Raymond Williams (1976)
noted culture as a most beguiling term in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and
Society. Despite this range, anthropological culture is generally understood as patterned
systems of meaning, neither entirely bound nor entirely subsumed within larger power
contexts (Crehan 2002:42-45). In this milieu, cultural anthropological concern is
knowledge of the cultural “Other.” Yet, as cultural anthropologists manage this complex
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whole, they too have moved to more applicable terms like identity and discourse
(Foucault 1978), and habitus and doxa (Bourdieu 1977).
The cultural anthropologist assesses human subjectivity within culture and then
attempts to portrait a specified cultural subjectivity within an understanding that all
human subjectivity is cultural. The cultural anthropological project manifests by
considering the human subject as part of culture, but who also lives and acts as a
knowledgeable cultural agent. The anthropologist must, therefore, also rely on subjective
common sense, reflective accounts, and memories of the cultural subject‟s own telling. In
turn, ethnographic data is gathered and interpreted by the cultural anthropologist.
Ethnographic knowledge endures then as inter-subjective accounts of humans in culture
and human culture more broadly. Knowledge is constructed subjectively through the
anthropologist‟s own cultural beliefs. Though this perspective may not circulate among
today‟s cultural anthropologists in the same ways, it still deeply resonates with the queer
dilemmas I propose in this thesis. Historian George Stocking (1989) proposes this
anthropological longing for culture as a desire to capture what it means to be a cultural
human being, and a longing to somehow limit one‟s personal peculiarities and passions
when interpreting „Other‟ cultures. This is a generous and noble interpretation of cultural
knowledge makers as human ambassadors to other humans for other humans. Though
some may criticize this vision as politically naïve, I am still inspired by this historical
interpretation of desire and longing for a wider cultural understanding.
The quality of anthropology‟s effort and its status as a human and social science
are not immune to broad critiques and anxieties. I now address three major criticisms of
social and cultural anthropology. I roughly sketch this in historical order but ultimately
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recognize these criticisms neither begin, nor end, within the intellectual work of social
and cultural anthropology. I offer these criticisms because I find useful parallels to the
queer theoretical project. I begin with the assessment of the “problem of culture.” Next, I
briefly address the historical traditions of race, primitivism, and human difference within
social and cultural anthropology. Finally, I examine postcolonial and postmodern
criticism as aimed at anthropological knowledge and anthropologists. I suggest these
criticisms create a fertile ground where queer anthropology blooms in the intellectual
aftermath.
As Michael Elliot explains in The Culture Concept: Writing and Difference in the
Age of Realism (2002), the problem in the beginning of anthropology was “to portray
culture as a coherent object without ignoring the possibility of cultural change, and to
appreciate the complexity and power of culture while still accounting for the fate of the
individual at odds with it” (177-178). At the turn of the American and European 20th
century the concept of cultures made two other irreconcilable fears logical: the fear of
homogenization by the “leveling forces” of technological modernity, and a fear of
miscegenation and other racialized collusion (Elliott 2002: xv). The historical concept of
cultures was also a means of alleviating social anxieties through the systematic reduction
of “other” culture into something fully separate in both space and time—an effort to
produce subjectivities of difference divisible by geographic space and evolutionary time.
This type of cultural analysis produced so-called primitive cultures and peoples. This
sentiment seems to still hold sway in contemporary thinking on anthropology. I think of
the recent addition of the Anthropologie store in gentrified spaces. It is a high-priced
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trinket, household goods, and clothing store that appeals to a notion of arts and crafts
produced by fleshless and spaceless global “cultures.”
My peers often commented on their slight embarrassment in revealing their
anthropological studies to other students because notions of “primitive people” in
contemporary times still circulate. It was also due to few peers grasping what
anthropologists study (apes? sex? “Indians”? bones?). This reticence also functioned to
avoid titillating and short-sighted comments anthropology sometimes inspired in others.
Anthropology‟s diverse scope across four general sub-fields of knowledge (social and
cultural anthropology, archaeology, linguistic anthropology, and biological anthropology)
certainly inspires cross-disciplinary confusion.
My peers and I would laugh when we assessed the diverse texts we would tote,
from evolutionary studies on human ancestry to ethnographies of romance and kinship.
Our humor aside, this reveals our own confusion over how to embrace a proper
disciplinary history in a climate of political suspicion about cultural difference. Yet we
also understood through our studies that now taken for granted assumptions of cultural
subjectivity, cultural relativism, and beliefs all humanity‟s equivalence is also rooted in
this disciplinary history. As Regina Darnell points out, notions of human equality were
not always granted the almost unconscious status in Western political life as they are
today (2001:12-28). Of course, these sentiments are not shared by everyone. Primarily,
though, cultural anthropology is criticized for its role in the historical shaping of nonWestern “primitivism”. Despite the historical condition of this charge, anthropologists
still deal with similar short-sighted criticism. Regina Darnell and Stephen O. Murray
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(2001) argue that grappling with these invisible genealogies should continually invigorate
our research. They state:
Much in our disciplinary past does not meet present-day standards of ethics,
indeed, is ethnocentric at best. But while other social scientists continue to
emphasize the gap between civilized and so-called primitive—a perspective
deeply embedded in Western civilization—anthropologists have been listening to
cultural others and trying to engage in dialogue. There are lessons in the failures
as well as in the successes. [Darnell 2001: xiii]

Failures and successes need not remain invisible, each are worthy of historical and
contemporary discernment. And the effort to actually engage with real, material human
beings I consider a necessary endeavor, perhaps even more necessary in our time.
Recent efforts in queer theory similarly attempt to celebrate the accidents, failure,
and missed connections in cultural life—to seek out invisible genealogies that others shy
away from in embarrassment, in shame, and with melancholy political apologies
(Halberstam 2011). Yes, anthropological understanding coordinates a complicated set of
contemporary politics, historical embarrassments, and cultural misunderstandings. The
anthropological tradition and its methods remain, however, a unique project precisely
because it risks confronting the object of inquiry—cultural subjects are worth knowing,
“people are not dupes but experts, analysts, even theoreticians” (Darnell 2001:7). This
effort is valuable because it attempts to synchronize ideas about power/knowledge,
complex sets of cultural crossings, and always pungent political choices.
There is another shared anthropological and queer dilemma about human
subjectivity: what does it mean to be different? What does it mean to be different across
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borders and within liminal spaces? Postcolonial criticism launched in the 1970‟s to the
1990‟s implicated anthropological traditions within colonial practices of domination, and
contested idealizations of cultural difference (Huggan 2001; Said 1978). Postcolonial
theorizing criticized the concept of culture, and it attempted to illuminate the complexity
embedded within the meaning of nation, Empire, and the citizen. This criticism also
reminded scholars that knowledge makers should be held accountable for the fates of
those being studied (Argyrou 2002). This criticism revealed how material life was always
battered by the flows of colonialism and postcolonial globalization. There are no cultural
islands in postcolonial theory; cultural subjectivity is political subjectivity. This idea is
also intensely cultivated in queer theories—there are no non-queer islands of apolitical
sexual subjectivity. But does this mean researchers will always locate politicized sexual
identities everywhere?
Postcolonial theorist Chandra Mohanty (1995) criticized liberal, Western
feminism for reproducing colonial relations of gender and sex within global feminism
and empowerment programs. Western feminisms may work under the banner of
liberation but don metaphorical masks of culturally universal womanhood—an
assemblage of Western political detail, accented with ethnographic detail for intellectual
concealment. With this postcolonial perspective in mind, social and cultural theorists
should be measured as knowledge gatherers and fact-makers on race, native peoples,
Westward expansion, and often in service of Imperial and colonizing efforts (Patterson
2001:3; Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997). Postcolonial critique should still help serve as a
warning when social and cultural theorists are now expected to cultivate knowledge and
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comment on the diversity of global “sexuality.” The demand for a universal sexuality is a
perilous queer dilemma.
Similar to Mohanty‟s criticism of a recognizable, straightforward, universal
womanhood, we now seem to expect a universal sexuality waiting to be freed. There is
now a demand for an intelligible, universal sexuality. This demand is especially prevalent
in ideals of a “gay” subjectivity waiting to be freed throughout the world. Documentary
films like Dangerous Living: Coming Out in the Developing World (Scagliotti 2005) and
the PBS broadcast Frontline: The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (Doran 2010) offer ample
evidence of this effort. Both films express a passion for sexual freedom and autonomy,
yet neither documentary adequately addresses local and material contingencies that
profoundly complicate Western efforts to raise a banner for universalized sexual freedom.
For example, in Dangerous the “developing world” is never addressed as a postcolonial
effect. Local forms of sex, pleasure, and affection are not connected in any meaningful
way to global politics except to assert that “coming out” as gay is dangerous in Egypt and
Iran, and viewers should unquestionably condemn regimes that condemn
“homosexuality.” Certainly pleasure, affective alliances, and real lives are at stake in this
documentary, and it is indeed alarming to watch anyone rounded up and chained, for any
reason. But this documentation is also clear evidence of a tendency to universalize
sexuality as sexual identity and un-problematically equate this to political, democratic
freedom that is only enjoyed in the homeland of the filmmakers.
Jasbir Puar (2010) warns of the tendency to assert Western sexual freedom as
rhetorical evidence for global political and military incursions. She condemns the
neoliberal equation asserting American and Western tolerance of “homosexuality” as
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evidence of democratic equality. She names this a “homonationalism” that works to
codify anti-Muslim extremism, racism, and ethnocentrism within ideals of sexual
freedom. As I consider the actual political ambivalence and resistance to sexual
differences in Western nations (Rubin 1984), I understand this with some irony.
In Dancing Boys, documentarians propose themselves as offering anthropological
insight into local traditions of dancing boys. The rituals and performances of the dancing
boys (some adolescents, but mostly teenagers) are scrutinized by the filmmakers and
condemned as practices of sexual predation. The dancing boys are often “purchased”
through family networks, or traded, and perform stylized dances for rural men‟s
associations. It seems that some of the boys are highly valued, some are physically
harmed, and some engage in sexual exchanges with certain men. There are a number of
ways to criticize cultural practices in various locales, and one should never discount the
need for political intervention in practices of abuse and torture. But my criticism asks
how this long-standing tradition (the filmmaker makes this point) is presented as obvious
evidence for Western intervention in “tribal” areas of Afghanistan. The film‟s narrator
admits that a dancing boy is an “ancient” tribal practice yet “secretly revived.”
Apparently if it was ancient, but never ceased, it would be less of a concern. Either way,
the history, anthropology, and variable details of this tradition are not presented, but the
need for sexual “modernity” is ostensibly a rationale for military and political
intervention of some kind.
The third criticism of anthropological knowledge is postmodern. Postmodernist
stances are used to critique the ideal of an apolitical, knowable, and universal human
subject (Connor 1997; Lyotard 1984; Rabinow 2003). Postmodernism intentionally
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ruptured the possibility of an apolitical cultural reality. In other words, how do we assess
whole human subject in the first place? What potential knowledge is eliminated by ideals
of normalcy? Accordingly, erecting “legitimate” knowledge is always at the expense of
other ways of knowing. Effort should be made to determine what systematization buries,
not what it supposedly reveals (Rabinow 1985). Yet we humans must live and cooperate
within some set consistencies; human culture is defined by this fact. How do we preserve
values of equality within this contested theoretical postmodern terrain? This positions and
substantiates some queer theorizing as well. The system of sexuality can be thus
examined, queerly, for what it disguises in the service of a coherent systemization for the
body and its pleasures—called sexuality. Yet how do we move from one set of cultural
coordinates (and cultural places) to another and still preserve any idea of equality and
nondiscrimination that may have been courageously carved from a sex/gender system of
sexuality?
With these previous examples I illustrate how historical, postcolonial, and
postmodern contentions cut ragged paths within academic disciplines, and distinctly alter
cultural research. I hope reviewing these criticisms foregrounds a key (and queer)
question: Whose thinking is privileged in the politically and materially loaded circulation
of meaning? Simply, this reminds me of what children hurl back when called upon to
change their behavior or perform some tedious task: Who says? With these serious
criticisms one could assume cultural anthropological theorizing would collapse under the
weight of the charges (certainly some wish this), but it changed, adapted, and I argue
improved. Many of these indictments aimed beyond anthropology to Western philosophy,
and epistemology more generally in the first place. The absorption of these criticisms,
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though, sets a particularly appropriate stage for queer theorists‟ direct, politicized, and
critical work in destabilizing normative knowledge about sex and sexuality within
cultural theory. Perhaps it is no surprise then that queer anthropology has formed such a
productive embrace in the last decade (Boellstorff 2007b; Bousiou 2008; Gopinath 2005;
Gray 2009).

Thinking Queer Anthropologically
The Queer Nation Manifesto, distributed during a 1991 protest in Washington
D.C., partly states:
It‟s not about the mainstream, profit-margins, patriotism, patriarchy or being
assimilated. It‟s not about executive directors, privilege and elitism. It‟s about
being on the margins, defining ourselves; it‟s about gender-fuck and secrets,
what‟s beneath the belt and deep inside the heart; it‟s about the night. Being queer
is “grass roots” because we know that everyone of us, every body, every cunt,
every heart and ass and dick is a world of pleasure waiting to be explored. Every
one of us is a world of infinite possibility. We must fight for ourselves (no else is
going to do it) and if in that process we bring greater freedom to the world at large
then great.

The intersection of queer and anthropology may surprise some scholars and activists;
what with anthropology‟s emphasis on extant culture and queer theory‟s initial focus on
textual criticism aimed at Western society‟s heteronormative (the assumption that
heterosexuality is always natural and normal) and homophobic social institutions. I hope
by reviewing the aforementioned criticisms the crossing of anthropology and queer
theory is clearer.
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Queer theorizing proposes intentional, politicized ways to disrupt binary thinking
about the sexed body, gender, and especially sexuality (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004;
Warner 1999). Queer theory crucially re-imagines subjectivity and the categories of sex,
pleasure, and agency in relation to sexuality (Turner 2000:106-138; Butler 1990;
Sedgwick 1990). Heteronormative assumptions continually assert heterosexuality as
natural, essential, biological, and normal for all people, everywhere. Heteronormativity is
critiqued by queer theorists as male-centered, genital centered (the act of “penetration”),
and intentionally ignorant of political and material economies of sexual culture.
Heteronormativity undergirds and constructs much of contemporary and conventional
thinking about sex, identity, and desire; this presupposed logic commands allegiance in
deep and wide-ranging ways (Jagose 1996; Wilchins 2004).
Queer theorists attempt to critique “normal” heterosexuality because it remains
the touchstone for the majority of contemporary social institutions (family, education,
politics, religion, government, among many others). Queering heteronormative life
proposes self-consciously transgressive confrontations with the normative rules and
expectations of sexuality (Turner 2000:1-35; Sullivan 2003:37-56). Queer theorists attack
the coherency of identity, and they condemn registers of sexual identity as absolutely
necessary in contemporary social life. Queer theorists are more interested in what people
“really do” and, critically, what they do in resistance to domination and injustice.
Queer theorizing then proposes necessary political and social breaches (Jagose
1996; Wilchins 2004; Warner 1999; Sullivan 2003) in the damming and containing of
gender, sex, sexuality, and even love (Kipnis 2003). Through close inspection artificial
reservoirs of assumed natural orders can be disrupted. Ideally, sexuality is disrupted as an
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apparent, universal category of meaning and a binary notion of sexuality, understood as
heterosexuality or homosexuality, is rejected (Foucault 1978; Halperin 1990). Queering,
perhaps of all sexual theorization, recognizes how sexuality operates as a discursive
regime in contemporary Western culture. It takes Foucault‟s work on sexuality as central
to its project (Spargo 1999). In other words, queer theorists assert that sexuality is the
way we, as cultural and sexual subjects, are allowed to understand sexual knowledge
about ourselves, about others, and about what human bodies potentially can be. Queer
theory violates paradigmatic thought on sexuality‟s supposed essential humanness.
Despite all of the contemporary research on “sexuality,” an ideal of essentialist
thinking on sexuality still remains hegemonic in Western culture (Vance 2005:15-32).
Sexuality is now an important topic of research in the majority of academic disciplines. It
is called trendy, celebratory, justified, and necessary; it captivates contemporary social
theorists and social scientists. Thus in name and in study (even when contested) sexuality
remains the premier way for thinking about pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social
agency. It is a supposed bodily container that holds multiple, contrasting ideations of the
body and its pleasures, but still manages to contain them all. Sexuality circulates in
pragmatic, every day, sophisticated, and politicized ways. To queer theorize is to begin
with the assumption that sexuality is a historical and not altogether pleasant frame for
understanding bodies and pleasure. It is assumed to be for our bodies—for all bodies, in
all places, and all times. In its monolithic place, queer theory offers instead theories of
fluid desires, contingent pleasures, and overlapping affections and intimacies.
In summary, queer theorizing rejects a stable, natural essence to sexuality as
bodily pleasure and affection. It also equally rejects positing that “truth will allow us to
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recognize without shame the meaning of our desire” (Mansfield 2000:105). Queering
aims to tear apart, to render unstable, to expose bias, to offer critical questions, but no set
answers, to upset, to delegitimize, and to “camp up” (Newton 1979) heteronormative
knowledge and all its institutions. Queer theorists like Riki Wilchins, Michael Warner,
Kate Bornstein, Jonathan Ned Katz, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and Jeffrey Weeks criticize
assimilation and instead value radical political interrogation and action (Jagose 1996;
Weeks 1995; Sullivan 2003).
Though queer theorists‟ political practices may not neatly align, questions about
the value of assimilation remain a central node in queer criticism. In this way, queering
celebrates the individualized and radical potential for altering social meaning. This
dovetails with the anthropological need to account for social agency, resistance, and
cultural change. To queer is to realize both the realities and possibilities that attend to
fluid expressions of pleasure, affection, and intimacy. I argue this composition of human
sexual subjectivity remains cultural, but queer theorists also stridently value the wielding
of cultural practices in socially disruptive ways. Queer anthropologists then must invest
human subjectivity with abilities that counter hegemonic order in clever, social, and
personal ways. The queer anthropological subject is composed as simultaneously valuing
disrupting approved sexual and bodily behavior, and granting pleasure to behaviors
deemed illegitimately sexual.
Despite this ambitious focus on agency, queer theorists are routinely criticized for
feeble work on material and pragmatic daily existences where agency actually takes
shape in everyday and sometimes not so fantastical ways (Hennessy 1996, 2000; Morton
1996:1-33). Queer theorists are criticized for avoiding key material determinants like
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class, race, reproduction, and other aspects of life. Rosemary Hennessy outlines how
identity political agendas, whether queer or not, set out to legitimize oppressed social
groups while “leaving the organization of social life in fundamental ways unquestioned”
(1996:215). This is evident in an anemic, if not wholly absent, critique of late-industrial
capitalism. Critics argue that instead of offering economic solidarity across classes, queer
theories actually do little to disrupt hegemonic culture and merely enable illusions of
critique by lauding “porous, gender-flexible and playful subjects, subject more adequate
to the multinational commodity exchange” and this is “embarrassingly inadequate”
(1996:232).
I ask: Does queer theory merely replicate the normative customs it hopes to
upend, queer, and make strange? Dana Cloud certainly assesses queer theory in such a
way:
In spite of its manifest opposition to normalizing familial discourses, [queer]
replicates this logic…Further, queer theory, like family values rhetoric, discredits
collective political responses to social problems in favor of ludic textualist
strategies. It poses utopian experiments in intimate fulfillment—akin to the 1950s
suburban family ideal—in lieu of a collective, political struggle. [Cloud 2002:72]

In this estimation queer theory ineffectually theorizes intimate, sexual spheres as sites of
resistance and emancipation. In other words, queer theorists simply imagine our
affectionate alliances and pleasurable capacities hold all the seeds for social
transformation and economic equity. For critics like Cloud and Hennessy, structural
economic problems are cast onto so-called personal lives as personal problems
(something neoliberalism already does); queer theory may simply sustain inequitable
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economic structures. Is effective political attention deflected away from politics when
theorists are mostly concerned with self-inventions of identity, and imagined arenas of
private life? I propose that queer anthropology offers a tonic to such sexual and material
concerns directed at more theoretical queer studies. Queer anthropologists Tom
Boellstorff, Martin Manalansan, David Valentine, and Kath Weston must manage both
queer theoretical ambitions and anthropologically grounded realities of human cultural
subjectivity.
Sexuality does remain an evocative theory of individuated personhood,
heteronormativity, and masculine economic rationality despite queer efforts to historicize
and destabilize these embedded meanings. Yet, our queer anthropological efforts can also
aim through sexuality to disrupt what Hennessy argues is “capitalism‟s increasing
colonization of the body and sensation” (Hennessy 2006:388). She further notes how
“Affective needs that are organized into what gets called „sexuality‟ are only one aspect
of much broader affective and sensate relations that feature in everyday life” (2006:389).
This is a vital point and queer anthropology may offer this queering of structure and of
everyday life—but I argue this potential is corroded when employing and relying on
sexuality to describe and explain pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency.

Sex, Sexuality, and Economic Development Programs
I use critical discourse analysis to challenge the paradigmatic status of sexuality
for framing and discussing pleasure, affection, intimacy and social agency throughout
this thesis. The ideal of a coherent and universal sexuality simultaneously maintains
understanding of other bodily domains like health, reproduction, gender, as well as other
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embedded meanings of sexual identity, sexual politics, and familial life. A queer dilemma
is thus invoked in economic development programs that focus on sex and sexuality: how
is sexuality in these cases an assumed a priori universal category, yet also a domain for
self-inspection and active social interrogation, and also a discursive site for economic
promises of development? In other words, how is sexuality assumed to be something one
is “born with” but also a site for understanding human subjects as dynamic, affectionate,
and active social agents within economic development ideologies?
Adams and Pigg ask in their anthropological critique of economic development,
Sex in Development: Science, Sexuality, and Morality in Global Perspective, “how the
proliferation of modes of speaking and writing about sexuality were and are imbricated in
managing complex differentials of power and in effecting dispersed means of social
control, particularly through forms of self-revelation and monitoring” (2005:5).
Accordingly, a key dilemma for queer anthropological study is how we can assess sexual
cultures and cultural differences while managing the Western ideology of sexuality as the
transit point of intelligible knowledge and meaning about sexual behavior. All the while
researchers must remain nimble and imaginative enough to account for the cultural
specificity of sexual cultures and resulting sexual subjectivities.
How then can we discuss sexuality—without sexuality? This is a profoundly
important question to ask about economic development ideologies that promise economic
incentives and benefits for participating. This is a very queer dilemma, indeed, when
local informants also must manage the local ideals of pleasure and affection, in contrast
to local, national, or global forms wedded in economic development programs. In
economic development the category of practice bumps headfirst into the category of
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analysis. In other words, the first question for queer anthropology is how to name sex,
pleasure, and affection, if not sexuality? What if the subjects of study do understand and
negotiate the category of sexuality as well? Simply, what if human beings note that they
“do have one?” Then, if we study local sexual practices do we simultaneously flatten
local custom and knowledge while rendering sexuality as the rightful place holder for
intelligible knowledge about the body‟s pleasures and affections? Then how can we
assess this traction when all the choices are composed in the context of real economic
need and the promise of economic development? These questions foreground the call for
a queerer anthropological understanding of sexual behavior, pleasure, and agency—by
limiting sexuality and offering something meaningful and imaginative in its place. This
all then must be translated for an audience. This is not a simple task.
Adams and Pigg (2005) pay close attention to how economic development models
increasingly favor standards of sex and fertility, and recently offer attention to the ideal
of identity-based, universalized sexualities. Sexuality, as a category of assumed
personhood and personal understanding, supports notions of economic development in
several ways. It is useful to remember that “a more nuanced and historicized
understanding begins from the… proposition that a world economy is a bounded social
totality which may or may not be world-wide in scope. Here, globalization refers to the
reach of particular social practices throughout an extant world economy” (Germain
2000:73). This particular ideal of sexuality functioning only as a Western invention of
control may ignore how systems of social production always were and continually are
interconnected throughout global economies.
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Ann Stoler explores (1995) such colonial interactions with Western categorical
inventions of sex and body. She argues that sexual and gendered categories are mapped
primarily through colonial interactions and imperial anxieties. Sexuality, in this view,
was already composed within the intimate associations of colonialism, race, and the
development of education and psychology. While the factory system and industrialization
develops in Europe and, later, in the United States, the colonial process is already well
underway. The development of education models, psychological discourse and, essential
to my study, economical sexology is inculcated and constructed with this colonial
knowledge. A system of sexual disenfranchisement, ordering of slave and underpaid
labor, and social anxieties about the family and women are all transformations that cannot
be understood without attending to colonialism and colonial history (Stoler 1995, 2002;
Minitz 1985). This history resonates in economic development programs that attend to
sex, sexuality, and sexual rights in contemporary societies. This still applies then to
globalization and neoliberal development ideologies today.
Attention to women‟s bodies, sex, and sexual rights encompass a large area of
governmental and non-governmental economic development programming, as well as
more recent programming under the banner of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender
(GLBT) activism and equal rights. Both label their aid within a rubric of personal and
political freedom, both deploy conceptions of coherent sexualities, and both profess a
self-evident need to be freed (in these cases, both economically and politically). As
Foucault clarified, however, even when using the supposedly neutral category of “sex”
this presupposes and imagines a world of specific, universally intelligible sexual behavior
as sex acts—as “sex” and thus as sexuality (1978:155-157).
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The International Reproductive Rights Research Action Group endeavors to
present the perspectives and experiences of women throughout the world and engage in
localized political action. I admire their work and attention to many of the dilemmas I
detail in this thesis. The researchers make explicit a reliance on the women‟s own words
(Petchesky and Judd et al 1998). The group declares that without “voices” of women
commenting on local cultural context research into reproduction, gender, labor, and
sexuality will remain embedded in problematic assumptions of an assumed universal
applicability. I find this point important and necessary for my study. Their research
shares a commitment to the broad category of feminist intervention in public policy,
while noting that what constitutes human rights is contentious in local, cultural, and
national contexts.
Rosalind Petchesky outlines (1998:19-20) how what gets counted as local and
useful political intervention may still be encumbered though with issues and errors of
translation, a reduction of local experiences to fit Western categorical frameworks of sex,
and a misuse of cultural knowledge. Collaboration with locals is always more desirable
though than not. Her research attempts to expand on several cross-cultural themes:
reproduction (encompassing both biological and social reproduction throughout the life
cycle); rights and entitlement (human “integrity” mixed with local understanding of
oppressive local conditions); “body and self;” and “accommodation and resistance.” All
theorists in the group are committed to “positive action” and “empowering changes in the
lives of those who are both its subjects and agents” (Petchesky and Judd 1998:20). These
concepts, while providing grounding, remain highly contested within the working
research group.
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Importantly, Petchesky recognizes sexuality as a separate category that includes
pleasure, desire, and sex and not reducible to reproduction and the birthing of children. In
doing so the group recognizes that sex and sexuality should be understood distinctly from
reproduction and fertility. But is that the way sex and sexuality is experienced on the
ground? Petchesky notes that intellectuals and activists in the group confront
unpredictable results when accounting for local agents who may not agree, nor support
the programs and politics of development (even in the name of sexual freedom)
(1998:20). In other words, local agents may not always subscribe to the agendas,
language, or perspective of those who want to speak politically on their behalf in the
name of development, queer interventions, or anthropological knowledge. The credibility
of sexuality as a category of analysis is severely strained in this context. Petchesky
admirably handles this dilemma and provides a compelling framework for research into
the complexity of sexuality employed as a model of development. Yet, even when the
Action Group focuses on the collaborative notion of shared language nowhere is sexuality
understood as already distorting an understanding of the conditions the group hopes to
ameliorate, namely political economic conditions and the rights and agency of women.
I am not arguing that sexuality should be disassociated from sex, but that local
“sex” and pleasure may not be translatable to the researchers‟ invocation of sexuality in
the name of the women they are advocating for. Can we listen more closely? Can we
also attend to pleasure and affections that speak to local, lived experiences without
hauling out sexuality to coordinate every pleasurable meaning? For example, in the essay
“Not Like Our Mothers,” Simone Grilo Diniz, Cecilia De Mello E Souza, and Paula
Portella further explain how the categorical separation of work, labor, reproduction, and
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sexuality is not always applicable to working populations they interview who view little
to no distinction between the work of cleaning houses, the work of raising families, and
the work of “sexual relations” (Diniz et al 1998). This point foregrounds the body as a
“working instrument,” whereas Western separate spheres of sexuality and labor do not
account (in fact romantically refuse) this lived reality. One woman details her life of
work: “I had no youth because I got married at eighteen and life became routine. Work,
heat your belly at the stove and chill it at the sink. That is all you learn. Move, chicken!
Shut up, boy! Today many things are changing, but for me nothing changed. It is always
the same—field, home, kids, wash…” (1998:46). This points to a need to disengage
sexuality in queer anthropology and for realizing that pleasure may still be an instrument
of labor and work and exchange (even when invoking sex as a pleasurable act between
consenting agents) and may still operate as something not pleasurable in another context.
Similarly, Adriana Ortiz Ortega, Ana Amuchástegui, and Marta Rivas in
“Because They Were Born From Me” (Ortega et al 1998) detail sex as a male-initiated
and male-dominated domain of pleasure, as reported by Mexican female informants. The
authors keenly detail how sex and sexuality is not translatable, or cross-cultural, or a
discrete realm of negotiated sexual pleasures between consenting parties. This disturbs a
call for global sexual rights that speaks for women, men, and others by illuminating the
contradictory (and not always evident) ways sexual pleasure is considered an aspect of
the self. Like a local informant reported “I think that rights must be personal and not
because someone comes and tells you, „These are you rights‟; that‟s like he is ordering
something, right? We women have to say: „This is my right and this I have to do…‟”
(Ortega et al 1998:172). So, if we attempt to advocate for sexual rights, as sexuality, are
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we enforcing norms of sexual pleasure that are not cross-cultural, not personal, and not
local? Are we, in essence, demanding a global ideal of sexual pleasure? The categories of
Western life and meaning do not always neatly map in all places, and the fundamental
understanding of pleasure, affection, and intimacy may not neatly map across space
within Western culture or across cultures, as queer theory makes clear.
In the context of global campaigns and local agencies, when research assumes sex
as an autonomous right to pleasure we may also ignore the ways local agents report sex
as a burden of social labor, or of limited pleasures, or even as tangential to selfunderstanding. As Laura Ahearn makes clear in Invitations to Love: Literacy, Love
Letters and Social Change in Nepal (2001) what cultural subjects say and feel may be
quite different, and depending on the context, quite distinct. She notes how ideals of
individualism and romantic love were established and circulated along with the ideals and
programs of economic development. Do we then demand that sex always be pleasurable
in the way we need it to be? In this regard, when various programs administered by the
World Health Organization, the World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund and
other non-governmental agencies invoke sexuality as a necessary and obvious element of
human rights, they may do so in ignorance of the way pleasure is not necessarily
composed of the same choices in the assumed universal market of pleasure.
In summary, Sex in Development (Adams and Pigg 2005) and Negotiating
Reproductive Rights: Women’s Perspectives Across Countries and Cultures (Petchesky
and Judd 1998) critically inquire how sex and sexuality are introduced and employed in
economic development programs. They ask how programs of development rely on the
supposedly stable, scientific conceptions of sex and sexuality that, in turn, assume an
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absence of particular moralities. They argue instead that a stance on normal sexuality
already assumes Western codes of sex—albeit a moral code that assumes a “healthy”
sexuality as normal sexuality. Adams and Pigg foreground criticism of sexuality‟s
supposed “naturalness,” but they still unfortunately aim to produce a usable and
productive conception of sexuality that will address local moralities within development
programs. As the editors remind: “all sexualities are local” (Adams and Pigg 2005:5).
But, as I argue, sexuality is never local but pleasures, affections, and bodies may be.

Queer Anthropology, Without Sexuality
Manolo Guzman (2006) critiques the notion that gayness, homosexuality, and
same-sex desire are mutually intelligible. In Gay Hegemony/Latino Homosexualities,
Guzman demonstrates that same-sex desires in the New York, Puerto-Rican diaspora
navigate and negotiate around a “long duree” of gay history (2006:1). He complicates the
idea that a gay subject emerges in similar ways, always in the heart of the city (2006:1).
He implicates an older racial typology of “the one drop rule” to understand the emphasis
in gay culture for stable sexualities (2006:91). In other words, one touch, one “sex act,”
one momentary or continuous pleasure is the one-drop that proves a latent, closeted
homosexuality yearning to be gay. It is unfortunate that he relies so explicitly on
“homosexualities,” though, to arrive at his very necessary point. He must understand that
this use of sexuality-based categories enforces an idealized orientation toward objectchoice and ignores its long complex history, even when pluralized to homosexualities and
contrasted with gay. Nevertheless, Guzman‟s evaluation of the conservative tendencies of
Western GLBT political programs, and the shadow it casts over those bodies not at the
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center of the assumed cosmopolitan sexual constellation are important for future queer
anthropological research.
Specifically, queering GLBT political programs reveals how global political
research too often simply harmonizes sexuality with a need for freedom of choice,
freedom of expression, and freedom of lifeway. This ignores material dimensions of
political economy, race, and class. Mainstream GLBT politics operate within a sexual
schema that recognizes sexuality (as sexual identity) as necessary evidence of a universal,
essential human condition. In other words, to make “sexuality” into sexual identity, and
thus a human right imperative within global development and social research, GLBT
organizations must accept a logic that runs counter to expressions to more material and
political choices. These organizations give life to sexuality as “not a choice” within
human life. Then, paradoxically, this naturalized, universal condition is primed for sexual
identification and assumed waiting and ready at the core of human sexual subjectivity, if
only one had more social choices. This is what queer anthropology must navigate and
overcome.
Adam Kuper (2003) follows a similar essentialist dilemma when researching new
claims of “indigenous rights.” He notes how indigenous groups in Canada resuscitated
outmoded anthropological ideas about cultural permanence and ethnic difference to
establish land-rights claims in Canadian courts. This is useful to my argument because
queer anthropologists must traverse similar knowledge about the social construction of
sexual identities, and strategic claims that sexual identities as categories of practice are
universal, natural born orientations. But we can and should also look to a more
thoroughgoing ground about bodies and pleasures to build other ideas about “rights” (if
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we want to use that term, at all). For example, we can claim all bodies and pleasures hold
some salience for rights discourse, or we could instead focus theoretical attention to more
generalizable affections and alliances, regardless of any conception of orientation. In
either case, as Kuper notes, “It is a good idea to call people by names they recognize and
find acceptable. Nevertheless, discredited, old arguments may lurk behind new words”
(2003:389). This queer dilemma of enjoining universal categories (say, supporting
economic development rationale in the name of sexuality, or arguing for sexual rights in
the name of sexuality and freedom) clash with other research that supports more queer
ideas of agency, interventions in local politics, or where the idea of choice may be more
politically effective. These are crucial questions that organize the edited anthology
Different Rainbows (Drucker 2001) and Tropics of Desire: Interventions from Queer
Latin America (Quiroga 2000).
Drucker pays particular attention to the dissonance between the “First-World”
gay/lesbian identities and the same-sex cultures and identities in, what he names, the
“Third-World.” He notes, “men in the Third World who have sex with men, and women
who have sex with women, have their own more or less distinct traditions, realities,
sexualities, and identities, which neither they nor outside observers always even see as
„lesbian‟ or „gay‟” (2001:207). Drucker‟s unease, though, is not necessarily about
criticizing “gay or lesbian,” but to figure how we build a movement that addresses all
those who are sexually oppressed. He aims to recognize the limits of social research and
political movements that only articulate a limited range of sexual identities with a
backdrop of relatively stable, capitalistic economies. Drucker struggles, on the other
hand, to figure what terms to use to accomplish such a task. He employs the concept of
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sexual cultures, then uses same-sex identities, and then relies on sexualities. Sexuality is
the least rewarding as it leaves out transgender, sex work, and sexual behavior that cannot
be neatly categorized within sexual identity. Sexual cultures, at least, provide a ground
for analysis. He queerly contests hegemonic sexual rights movements that only organize
those willing to speak in similar terms, and in similar ways, while ignoring the political
economic conditions that motivate sexual oppression in the first place. Throughout his
writing I longed for him to eliminate sexuality altogether as is clashes with his quest for a
sexual rights movement that pays attention to political economy. This is complicated by
sexuality that I argue is already a classed and gendered economic philosophy of the body
and its pleasures.
José Quiroga (2000) similarly critiques the notion of a universal set of sexual
identities, with similar needs and affections and built from an ideal of sexuality. He
criticizes the imperatives of contemporary sexuality: the demand for sexual identity and
social sexual visibility, the notion that homosexuality can be a useful category in all
places (even in the West), and the ideal that sexuality is always a struggle for an accurate
self-inspection. Sexuality, too, must always be composed with an object-choice and this
obviously troubles Quiroga; he explicitly avoids pronouncing sexuality throughout the
text, though he lapses into a pluralized sexualities. He pointedly asks “What use is there
for a queer studies that does not articulate a critique of class?” (2000:233). In this way he
focuses attention on Latin American artists, writers, and activists who eschew explicit
demands for self-revelatory sexuality and swap more coded political and social
interventions. He argues that a demand for public articulations of sexuality serves to
stabilize oppressive political regimes by speaking in similar terms and this ignores the
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varying ways people forge alliances and resistance across sexual cultures. He hopes to
enjoin research and cultural criticism that “goes beyond identity” and, as I desire, beyond
an ideal of sexuality. Several other researchers also attempt to negotiate this queer
dilemma. I address each of these final texts with the goal of articulating new pathways for
queer interventions, away from the sexuality. I then address how each miss intellectual
opportunities with their use of sexuality.
Anthropologist Tom Boellstorff offers a “queer” reading and hopes to offer new
theoretical possibilities for research in The Gay Archipelago: Sexuality and Nation in
Indonesia (2005) and A Coincidence of Desire: Anthropology, Queer Studies, Indonesia
(2007a), Martin V. Manalansan attempts similar work in Global Divas: Filipino Gay Men
in the Diaspora (2003), and Elizabeth Povinelli articulates new ways of interpreting
liberal and neoliberal dilemmas of belonging, intimacy, and affection in Empire of Love:
Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality (2003).
How can queer anthropology build an account of pleasure, affection, and intimacy
that accounts for the multiple and overlapping contingencies of social life? Queer
anthropology attempts to account for both culture and enculturation, both the social and
radical social agency. Queer anthropologists and researchers attempt to account for social
constructions of sexual identity and also a personal accounting of how these constructions
fail to attest to lived, material realities, pleasures, and affections. Perhaps most
importantly, queer anthropologists must address social inequities and categories of
normalcy with a nuanced research program that maintains radical and disruptive political
criticism. The task at hand is to build an account of human sexual subjectivity that points
in these queer directions—without sexuality.
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Boellstorff offers an account of gay and lesbi Indonesians. He addresses the
necessity of intersectional, cultural analysis within a study of sexuality in the Indonesian
archipelago (2005). Boellstorff notes that an “Indonesian” ethnography does not exist for
a number of distinctive reasons: primarily the geographic reach and local knowledge of
island inhabitants renders “Indonesia” a conceptual problem. Second, national citizens do
not always primarily identify with the nation as a central feature of identity. Third,
anthropological knowledge has not produced a text that conceives its local subjects as
“Indonesian.” He then offers the lesbi and gay citizen as a newly realized national
subject, not reduced to the sole product of globalization and global economic
development. He does so to understand how local forms of identity are intersectional and,
therefore, how Indonesian lesbi and gay citizens understand themselves within local,
regional, and international cultural logics. He contrasts this to cultural analyses that overemphasize powerful institutional productions, which he argues flatten accounts of
individual subjectivity and erode local knowledge in service of theorizing an abstract
“discourse.” He offers instead an intersectional analysis that renders sexuality very well
meaningless, but then he assumes that without sexuality his other exceptional points are
unintelligible.
Boellstorff‟s ethnographic project aims to render queer anthropologically viable.
He recognizes the ways sexuality, gender, and other sexed categories are impossible to
negotiate as discrete, separate, local forms. While his informants do position themselves
with full knowledge of global sexual identity movements (evidenced in lesbi and gay
terminology), he argues that local life is not so entirely different from the gay and lesbian
subject positions profoundly shaped by the psychological and sexological discourses in
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the West (2005). But in doing so he assumes a stability of sexuality and sexual identity at
“home” to then complicate the notion of sexuality abroad. He also assumes that the
rational, consumer-oriented, masculinist logic already embedded in Western ideals of
sexuality operates much more tidily than I would argue it does.
People negotiate, resist, and transform identity “there,” and here. Boellstorff
creatively argues though for theorizing “queer time” by calling attention to the ways time
already operates in “straight” ways (2005). For example, assessing queer time is to
reimagine other ways of being in the world through emphasizing life‟s dis-junctures of
identity. Queer timing foregrounds the ways that life does not always flow according to
timely planning. Yet, straight time is never actually followed, as human subjectivity
works in queer time already. Human cultural models are, of course, indispensable to
human culture, but accounts of individual agency often point to slippages as well as
outright resistance. That is a departure point for creating new theories of queer human
subjectivity and agency. Humans are already queer, already non-conforming to an extent,
one need to just look—perhaps askew—at what already is being culturally offered,
performed, and resisted.
Boellstorff notes how sexuality studies often self-congratulate while recognizing
the linguistic and historical constructions of sexual categories (2005). Boellstorff
critiques the supposed and obvious benefit of such recognition by complicating the
portrait of a “globalized” sexuality. He claims that sexuality is neither entirely a Western
conception of the self, nor a reduction of local expressions of self separate from other
types of belonging. In other words, an assumption continues in sexual cultural studies
that local forms of sexuality are either exclusively local or entirely subsumed by
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globalized discourse of sexual identity. As Boellstorff makes explicit, cultural and social
processes are never tidy, and they do not need to be.
Sexuality need not be a singular domain moving along a single axis. Boellstorff
reminds readers that research should not confuse analytical and experiential categories,
similar to reducing sexuality to “sexual culture” and assuming it contains a discrete,
independent logic existing separate from other parts of culture (2005). Yet, as a matter of
convenience, a matter of interpretation, and a matter of writing, “sexuality” still remains a
primary and discretely employed term within his effort. This exemplifies both the
difficulty of his work (which he clearly recognizes) and the difficulty of escaping the
imprimatur where sexuality makes pleasure, affection, and the body meaningful to
readers, students, politics, and activists at home. Also, queer anthropological studies may
need to express sexual cultures more in terms of similitude than difference, in this way
others materialist ideas about pleasure, affection, and intimacy may move to the center of
our analyses. The discourse of identity, sexual rights, and other ideas of human
subjectivity need not move along an axis of sexuality. It could root in pleasure, the body,
and change—perhaps both radically inclusive and cross-culturally meaningful?
Boellstorff attempts a similar aim about cultural coincidences that may be productive for
queer studies.
Anthropology can theorize, not just detail queer life Boellstorff claims in
Coincidence of Desires: Anthropology, Queer Studies, Indonesia (2007a). In other words,
Boellstorff asks how “queering” may interrupt, alter, and reconfigure cultural notions of
time, belonging, and space in both theoretical and practical ways. To queer is to make
strange, to make linkages, and to make the seeming coincidences of life more readily
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available to anthropological understanding. Queer theory can illuminate distinctive
domains of gender, sexuality, and a “sexed body,” but he troubles these distinctions and
pointedly questions the anthropological utility of these formulas. In a discussion of
tomboys, femmes, lesbis, and “transvestites,” Boellstorff notices the intertwined
knowledge that render each intelligible in their local and national (and international)
contexts. In this way, Boellstorff further argues that queer should encompass an
intertwined range of understanding about non-normative identities. This may further the
possibilities of imagining and engaging in queer political interventions, yet to claim a
category of “non-normative sexualities” limits our critique of sexuality as always, already
necessary. To make linkages between the non-normative subjects he covers also assumes
that each pleasurable act, bodily movement, and expression must be categorically defined
as non-normative to take on queer political importance. Queering also imagines bodies,
pleasures, and agency that never fall within the surveillance of cultural expressions of
recognizable identity. In other words, people can kiss, hug, touch, fuck, embrace, caress,
and love without coherent and stable meaning at all. It may simply be—a coincidence of
bodies, pleasures, and desires.
Manalansan (2003), on the other hand, focuses on the shifting terrains of political
economy, migration, and queer identity. Queer, or gay and lesbian, can be conceived as
both liberation from and submission to a modernist, liberalizing world order. In this way,
to claim a sexual identity, inspired by Western sexual politics, does not necessarily mean
that local life and individual expression is somehow moot. Manalansan pays particular
attention to the “micropolitics” of personal identity within the lives of “gay” Filipino
migrants living in the diasporic communities of New York City. Manalansan sufficiently
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problematizes the conception of “Pride Without Borders” (the theme of NYC GLBTQ
Pride celebration in 1996). This theme imagines an American emancipation of sexual
identity extended throughout the world in a similar fashion. In this way we must contend
with the idea that the “outside” world is pre-modern (primitive, yet again). Despite this
criticism, Manalansan curiously posits his ethnography as a monograph to enable a
“global gayness.”
He declares an alliance with what he names “new queer studies,” which he sees as
scholars specifically concerned with the political stakes of pronouncing a vision of the
“global” while recognizing that this need not reduce local agency and local
understanding. He does not make room, however, for pleasures, bodies, and agency that
may desire all he celebrates, yet never desire and identify with his global gayness or
gayness at all. Sexuality, in his work, takes on various local forms, but is also understood
to prepare us for a vision of global solidarity. I do not devalue his ethnographic project
and meticulous work, but I question why his account of micropolitics does not account
for the vastly different ways cultural subjects experience and seek out pleasure, and for
what material purposes, if any.
It is certainly credible to research the global political projects of both his
informants and his own. Yet global political projects that aim for sexual sovereignty and
sexual alliances may not actually achieve the bulk of their aims if sexual is only
understood through an ideal of sexuality. There are more bodies, more pleasures, and
more affective alliances operating even in the lives and loves of those who claim
solidarity with global gayness. I think this is necessary to note in queer research. It is not
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just what we say we do, it also what we do. Queer anthropologists can assess that in ways
that queer theorists, alone, have struggled to address in material and lived ways.
Global gayness celebrates a fantasy, and it still may be a useful and necessary one.
But we should avoid a fantasy based solely on a consumptive oriented world without
borders, whereas borders are entirely real when one has limited means and little political
viability for crossing them. Sexuality continually constructs the same economic borders
around bodies and pleasures that he hopes to undermine when he critiques the economic
fantasies of “gay modernity.” In any case, to maintain sexuality even as a contested
framework obscures some of the economic inequities he is concerned with. Sexuality
does not adequately offer a vision of a sexual subject actively forming alliances, adapting
to changes, and discovering new material life ways and new pleasures. Sexuality
imagines desire without social agency except for the classed and gendered subject
sexuality is built for (as I noted in Chapter 2). Even “global gayness” needs a more
diverse and active agent than that. His use of sexuality orders an organization of class,
gender, and desire that does not do justice to his own wonderful descriptions of his
informants. I turn now to a recent examination of Western life, and the ways the author
conceives of bodies and pleasures, without sexuality.
Elizabeth Povinelli (2006) examines liberal and neoliberal ideologies of
belonging that depend on irreducible tensions in Western political economic life. She
explores the way settlers (indigenous people in northern Australia, and Radical Faeries in
the United States) inhabit and negotiate liberal ideals mapped for the body. Her primary
objective is to understand the way intimacy and constraint are idealized and understood
in different societies, yet somehow remain synchronized across liberal zones of social
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order. Povinelli explicitly (and I argue queerly) avoids reference to “identity” and to
sexuality as an explicit, a priori category. She does note that “sexuality” is determined by
where and when it is constructed, but in relation to ideas of intimacy and within the
governing of a liberal society. She does so to encourage other, queerer ways of thinking
about the “social matrix.” How does identity takes shape in liberal discourses that seek to
establish norms of intimacy and, thus, containment?
Povinelli seeks to explain how intimacy is animated through autological
knowledge (the assumed self-making subject in liberalism) and genealogical knowledge
(the constraints, regulations, and “inheritance” of our historical knowledge); this is
another articulation of the queer dilemma. She offers a theory of carnality and intimacy
instead of sexuality—a provocative vision of pleasure, affection, and agency, while still
addressing the limitations ordered in contemporary life. In her work she recognizes the
ongoing dissonance of producing thick descriptions of “thick life.” She argues that life is
too rich, too thick, to be represented with anemic theories of sexual or gender identity and
that we need a political program where the density of “social representation is increased
to meet the density of actual social worlds” (Povinelli 2006:21). To understand human
subjectivity, queerly, is to understand a people within their skin, to account for feelings
that emerge, merge, and conflict across the surface of lived experiences, felt by the body,
and lived through the tensions, sensations, and releases of life.
In contrast, sexuality rarely offers an interpretation of carnality other than as a
problem of intimacy. Sexuality is thus far too blunt a register. It is built as an ideal for a
heteronormative, male, rational consumer subject. It is built out of class struggle and
social anxiety, and the very same struggles that some now hope to theorize ways out of
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by deploying sexuality. But sexuality cannot capture the passions, the fluidity, the
pleasures, and the thick resistances that queer anthropological theorizing hopes to
imagine. Peter Hitchcock (2003) extrapolates Arjun Appuradai‟s notion that resistance to
hegemonic and oppressive elements springs from the process of imagination. So, as much
as nations are imagined, as much as sexualities are imagined, as much as the
“naturalness” of specific sexual orders are imagined, so too must the possibilities of
resistance be imagined.
The challenge for queer anthropological studies is to recognize the way these
orders are asserted on the body. It is to also recognize the impact on the individual
“being” as social agent, and then first imagine strategies for resistance (Hitchcock 2003).
We must resist propositions of sexuality as indicative of modern freedom and equity. We
must counter this with the knowledge that a sexualized citizenry is already framed within
limited horizons of affection, intimacy, pleasure, and thus political possibility.
Admirably, Povinelli (2006) attempts a beginning at this charge, at this counter-attack
(Foucault 1978:157).
Finally, and perhaps the most perplexing queer dilemma of all, how can queer
anthropology imagine possibilities for pleasure, intimacy, affection, and agency when the
notion of a desiring rationality is already constructed as heterosexual, masculine, and
normative—as sexuality? Material evidence of rational life-making, in pleasure,
intimacy, and affection is stridently denied in contemporary sexual politics. Theories of
material rationality are, ironically, rejected by sexual liberationists who laud sexual
difference and diversity, but only if they are able to register these differences as
sexuality—only if they “are born that way.”
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What can it look like, what will it feel like, what political possibilities, and what
queer anthropology is possible if this queer dilemma is no longer a dilemma? What new
intellectual pathways may emerge when sexuality is rejected? What new ethical pathways
will emerge when queerness is embraced, not as an identity, but as a matter of
contestation, fluidity, change, fairness, pleasure and each understood as potent evidence
of rational thinking, ethical living, and active social agency? Queer, indeed. It is useful to
remember here that the richness of anthropological knowledge is built upon the desire for
holism, not on mechanical descriptions and hypotheses. Humans turn to other humans not
to make sense of the natural world in atomic specificity, but to make sense of a
spectacular range of emotion, expression, and cultural logic. Similarly, Gayle Rubin
offers that “the complexity of cuisines is no testament to the belly‟s hunger” (1984).
Queer anthropology may provide the possibility for exploring sex in all its contentious,
problematic, sublime, pleasurable, and disagreeable bearings. These final questions
provide ground for me to address Out in Theory: The Emergence of Gay and Lesbian
Anthropology (Leap & Lewin 2002).
Leap and Lewin (2002) make a claim about the necessity and validity of research
on sexual cultures. They may work from a problematic assumption that anthropology
formerly repressed knowledge about sexuality (Rubin 2011:354-355). Vital work that
aims to restore sex to its proper place in the house of anthropology (Weston 1998)
narrates an emphasis on loss, then a recovery of knowledge. This narrative manages the
story of sexual knowledge too closely to an ideal of repression; Foucault noted repression
was a hypothesis to produce, among other sentiments, a feeling of radicalism (Foucault
1978). The story of our “repression,” ironically gives life to sexuality and restricts other
103

possibilities for acknowledging bodies and pleasures. I note this to bolster my critique of
Leap and Lewin‟s outstanding, but problematic, Out in Theory (2002).
During the last three decades a necessary and not always welcome development
of gay and lesbian anthropology changed the way anthropology addressed sex,
theoretically, ethnographically, and within the discipline‟s professional practices. Leap
and Lewin certainly honor the tradition of anthropology as a necessary political
orientation, as well as a necessary academic discipline. They address the anthropological
crisis between the relation of anthropology and its subjects; they provide space for
feminist interrogations of a pervasive androcentric bias in the discipline, and they
positively evaluate the critical stances of postmodernism, postcolonial studies, and
cultural studies (Leap and Lewin 2002:1-2). This supports the anthropological
introduction I offer in this chapter, but from this agreement we part company.
I find it instructive to paraphrase Donald Kulick‟s review of Leap and Lewin‟s
earlier work Out in the Field: Reflections of Gay and Lesbian Anthropologists (1996),
which Leap and Lewin criticize in the introduction of their follow-up work Out in Theory
(2002). Kulick expressed concern about their specific focus on gay and lesbian
professionals “coming out,” and the political ramifications of pursuing gender and
sexuality research. He argued this produced substantial barriers to younger
anthropologists identifying and applying newer, queerer paradigms in anthropological
research. Leap and Lewin defend their well-received collection in light of his charge. I
find Leap and Lewin‟s volume to be important: it helps students and scholars understand
anthropological disciplinary history and academic sexual politics. Yet Kulick‟s critique is
well-founded, and I argue that the exclusive focus on an emergence of “gay and lesbian”
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anthropology does work to limit queer research. In response to Kulick, Leap and Lewin
argue that queer connections to anthropology were and still are under-developed. They
maintain that queer scholarship is notoriously anti-empirical, and that queer is an
“inclusive, generic focus” and thus not helpful. Leap and Lewin also reason that when
preparing their text there were absolutely no anthropologists willing to address the
connection between queer theory and anthropology (Leap and Lewin 2002:10-12). With
this dismissive coverage I can make one assumption as to why.
The right for scholars to identify as gendered and sexual beings certainly should
not limit opportunity in the professional academy. These identifications, however, do not
necessarily produce a more inclusive anthropological perspective on theory and practice,
by default. Anthropologists must also consider the theoretical, practical, and ethnographic
limits of this emphasis. Gay and lesbian-identified people obviously produce vital,
critical work within social and cultural research. Yet limiting “queer” or any other study
of pleasure, affection, and agency under a mantle of “gay and lesbian” considerably over
determines the necessity of Western social and sexual categories. Sexuality, as a
category, cannot be linked with the criticism I offer here if we already assume that our
social systems of identification are always politically, if not anthropologically, necessary.
Therefore Leap and Lewin‟s framing of sexual identity categories, sexuality, and sexual
orientation should be considered as problematic as an androcentric bias or homophobic
panic in academic life and in the production of our vital research.
I am not positing that homophobia, gender bias, and a general sex-phobia do not
regulate and restrain social and cultural research. I agree they do. But anthropological
analysis, queer ethnographic practice, and culture theory is not made more proper or
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more imaginative when our political beliefs, invested in sexuality, also launch our
anthropological studies. The categories of gay and lesbian or straight, and categories of
homosexual or heterosexual, each proceed from a belief and investment in maintaining,
without question, the idea of sexuality as the premier and necessary ground from which
to orient anthropological knowledge of pleasure, affection, intimacy, and social agency.
Leap and Lewin nobly argue that “coming out” de-stigmatizes anthropological
research into gay and lesbian life and homosexuality and heterosexuality (1996, 2002).
There is valuable work to be made by investing in studies where these categories align
within identified communities and their categories of practice (as I noted earlier in this
chapter). This still limits new research questions and limits knowledge on human sexual
subjectivity (in any case, I am still waiting for a rich, nuanced study of upper-class,
white, “heterosexuals”). In fairness, Leap and Lewin partially address this difficulty by
noting that local terms for gay and lesbian practice should be included in ethnography.
This though does not produce insight into the question I already problematize: how are
these local terms not equivalencies, and how does this offer new ways to understand
human sexual subjectivity in all its forms? Leap and Lewin imagine that without
sexuality, and without gay and lesbian categories, a quagmire of descriptive relativism
will ensue (2002:9). This is a necessary consideration in social and cultural research. But,
I argue, that we should jump into this quagmire and reassess the historical notions that
sustain “sexuality” as an immaterial frame for pleasures and affections within queer
anthropology before assuming relativism will be the obvious result.
In any case, Leap and Lewin do not address how these ideals of sexuality and
sexual identity occlude an understanding of overlapping “sexual worlds,” which Gayle
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Rubin calls for (1984). I like this finer point, because it does not reduce everything to an
estimation of “non-normative” sexual study, and this too is where queer theory often
breaks down. Too often the lines of normative and non-normative categorizations
resurrect sexuality without questioning it, in the first place. To queer anthropology and to
anthropologize queer theory is to de-stabilize the strict limits that sexuality conjures,
including the ideal of non-normative. In this way, everyone is a little bit queer, as the
saying goes.
We must fully interrogate the limits sexuality engineers as a category of analysis,
if not always as a category of practice. We need to reinvigorate the study of material
pleasures and affections. We need to more adequately assess how normative and nonnormative, homosexual and heterosexual, and gay and lesbian all corral insights about the
body and pleasure into a dull sexuality. This limits our material and political perspectives
on human sexual subjectivity. We need to imagine a human sexual subjectivity motivated
with agency, political intervention, belonging, and performing dynamic human affections
and intimacies within and across sexual cultures.
In conclusion, Gayle Rubin notes how the use of theories of social construction
“refined the theoretical bases for social approaches to sexual behavior” and inspired a
“vast outpouring of work that has continuously destabilized universal sexual categories
and increasingly placed sexualities in history, society, and culture” (Rubin 2002:43). So,
a vibrant transformation in the intellectual knowledge of sexual categories occurred, now
why not sexuality? Queer anthropology is a vehicle where vibrant transformations can
continue to occur, and we can and should push further. Tobias Rees asks how to “invent
new ways of being an anthropologist or ethnographer” in a world where anthropology
107

can “no longer make assumptions about what is necessary for their method to produce
rich ethnographic data—a temporally stable scene and subject of study” (Marcus and
Rabinow et al 2008:7). It is to continually ask the question: “What is anthropology today?
What could it be?” (2008:8). James D. Faubion further inquires in Designs for an
Anthropology of the Contemporary (Marcus and Rabinow et al 2008):
In the aftermath of a devastating critique, identity was to organize a lot of
people‟s projects as a kind of sun around which a variety of often quite politically
inflected interests could orbit together. Multiple currents of feminism, for
instance, were, in fact, quite productive in attaching themselves to the same sort
of orbit. It brought in gay and lesbian studies, which seemed to me to hold the
promise of being the next great force of the undoing of humanist essentialism.
Unfortunately, it hasn‟t accomplished very much in anthropology. It is limited
work, and I‟m not quite certain why. [Marcus and Rabinow et al 2008:34]

Queer anthropology may answer the question by providing a necessary flexibility for this
project. Queer anthropologists may also provide strategies and methods for imagining
human sexual subjectivity that allows for diverse ideas of pleasures and affections,
identities and non-identities, material practices and ideal relations. We must be willing to
revisit and interrogate our own theoretical presumptions. In doing so, sexuality and
“sexual freedom, identity, openness, and individual rights” (Engebretsen 2008:88) need
not be the most commanding forces in queer anthropological studies of bodies and
pleasures. We can create a queer anthropology—without sexuality.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion

The social construction of sexuality is not a novel claim (Foucault 1978). But I
hoped to emphasize how the political economic background of a history of sexuality is
often forgotten. Calls for economic justice, studies on the globalization of sexuality, and
cross-cultural research on material sexuality are all hampered by ignoring this history of
sexuality‟s construction. In this thesis I argued that sexuality was invented and
constructed to manage social economic anxieties. This crucial point is too often
understated or ignored in research that similarly attempts to understand the parallel
between economic literature, sexology, and sexuality. Sexuality was developed with a
rational, male, self-interested economic subject as the normative standard from which all
other affections, pleasures, and intimacies were judged.
Sexologists invented categories of non-normative affections and pleasures to
assert how differences expressed by bodies and pleasures were social problems needing
to be rectified. The category of sexuality was refined as a commentary on the bodies of
laboring classes, migrants, and women. By critically examining how sexuality developed
in parallel to neoclassical economic philosophy, which was already rooted with a
classical economic male subjectivity, I hoped to show that economic ideas paralleled and
aided the construction of a sexological human subjectivity. In the least, I hoped to further
elaborate on the economic pedigree of sexuality. Studies that do not take this history into
account often problematically assert the universality of sexuality as a meaningful
category of analysis with little attention to it as an economic philosophy of the body.
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I think that employing other categories of analysis may help us imagine other
ways to theorize bodies and pleasures. I hope this moves us along new research
pathways. This is evident in the merging of queer theory and anthropology. I assess this
merger because it is producing new research questions and new ways to address bodies,
pleasures, affections, and intimacies. Anthropological research on sex already maintains a
keen awareness of the culturally specific constructions of sex. Social and cultural
anthropology also offers methodologies that allow us to grapple with the real, material
conditions of people‟s lives, as they are lived. Queer theories re-frame and radicalize
social knowledge of sex, gender, and politics. Queer theorists generally propose human
sexual subjectivity as valiantly exceeding the limits of social control. To “queer,”
therefore, is to assess how human subjects engage in ongoing, active resistance to social
norms and social limitations.
This recent queer anthropological work offers a productive collaboration between
cultural theory, queer theory, and ethnography. But sexuality is a roadblock in this queer
anthropological collaboration. I hoped to show that a historical and social constructionist
account of sexuality that critiques neoclassical economic subjectivity may help us
imagine new pathways for understanding and pursuing research on affection, pleasure,
intimacy, and social agency. The category of sexuality orders and limits political
economic, anthropological, and queer interpretations of bodies and pleasures and thus
human subjectivity. In this sense, I push queer anthropology further by critiquing the
continued use of sexuality in this vital research. I maintain that we can build a queer
anthropology—without sexuality.
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